

IS THE U.S. NAVY PREPARED TO CONDUCT PEACE  
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL  
SECURITY STRATEGY?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Strategy

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2000

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20001120 032

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
<p>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.</p>			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 2 Jun 00	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis 6 Aug 99 - 2 Jun 00	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Is the U.S. Navy Prepared to Conduct Peace Operations in Support of the National Military Strategy?		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S)  LCDR David D. Clement Jr., USN			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/ MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE  A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)  This thesis investigates the preparedness of the U.S. Navy to participate in peace operations in support of the National Security Strategy, in terms of mission doctrine, training, and organization.  The thesis reviews U.S. Navy participation in three peacekeeping/foreign humanitarian assistance operational case studies that occurred during the past decade—Somalia, Haiti, and the Former Yugoslavia.  The thesis concludes that the U.S. Navy is correctly organized for major theater conflict. However, the U.S. Navy has proved capable of adapting to MOOTW operations. Further, while there are some training and doctrinal shortfalls, the U.S. Navy has performed in an exemplary manner in past operations and is currently making the needed mid-course corrections that will enhance future operations.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS National Security Strategy, Somalia, Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Peace Operations, Kosovo		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 102	16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

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
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: LCDR David D. Clement Jr.

Thesis Title: Is the U.S. Navy Prepared to Conduct Peace Operations in Support of the National Security Strategy?


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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

**IS THE U.S. NAVY PREPARED TO CONDUCT PEACE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY?**, by LCDR David D. Clement Jr., USN, 91 pages.

This thesis investigates the preparedness of the U.S. Navy to participate in peace operations in support of the National Security Strategy, in terms of mission doctrine, training, and organization.

The thesis reviews U.S. Navy participation in three peacekeeping and foreign humanitarian assistance operational case studies that occurred during the past decade--Somalia, Haiti, and the Former Yugoslavia.

The thesis concludes that the U.S. Navy is correctly organized for major theater conflict. However, the U.S. Navy has proved capable of adapting to MOOTW operations. Further, while there are some training and doctrinal shortfalls, the U.S. Navy has performed in an exemplary manner in past operations and is currently making the needed mid-course corrections that will enhance future operations.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank my thesis committee who went out of their way to help me in this ever-growing project. They had no obligation to volunteer for the task, and their support and guidance is deeply appreciated. Second, I would like to thank my family. Thanks to my son for making life more interesting as he learned to crawl, walk, run, and destroy in Kansas--a true Prairie Warrior. And thanks most of all to my loving wife, who I promised plenty of family time during "the best year of our lives." Alas, she seems to be under the impression that I spent the whole year at sea.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AABWS	Amphibious Assault Buoyant Water System
AJFP	Adaptive Joint Force Packaging
ALMDS	Advanced Laser Mine Detection System
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ATU	Amphibious Task Unit
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CVBG	Carrier Battle Group
CVW	Carrier Airwing
DENBN	Dental Battalion
DOD	Department of Defense
EW	Electronic Warfare
EWTG	Expeditionary Warfare Training Group
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FRAPH	Front for Revolution and Progress in Haiti
FSSG	Fleet Service Support Group
FYROM	Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
GAO	Government Accounting Office

HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HARM	High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile
HUMVEE	Highly Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
IFOR	UN Implementation Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munition
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JP	Joint Publication
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSOW	Joint Standoff Weapon
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF HAG	Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MEU (SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MIO	Maritime Interception Operations
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MPS	Maritime Pre-Positioning Ship
MPSRON	Maritime Pre-Positioning Squadron
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSSG	Marine Service Support Group
NCA	National Command Authority

NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
NETG	Naval Expeditionary Task Group
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NLLDB	Navy Lessons Learned Database
NLLS	Naval Lessons Learned System
NMCB	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
NMS	National Military Strategy
NNS	Navy News Service
NSS	National Security Strategy
NTIC	Navy Tactical Information Compendium
NWDC	Naval Warfare Doctrine Command
NWSA	Navy Wire Service "A"
OAS	Organization of American States
OPORDER	Operations Order
PE	Peace Enforcement
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PO	Peace Operations
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RO/RO	Roll-on, Roll-off Transport Ship
ROWPU	Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
SCCTV	Ship's Closed Circuit Television
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SEA hut	South East Asia Hut
SFOR	UN Stabilization Force
SLAM	Standoff Land Attack Missile
SLRP	Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPMAGTF	Special Marine Air Ground Task Force
SSES	Ship's Signal Exploitation Space
TARPS	Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TOPSCENE	Tactical Operational Preview System
TRANS	Army Transportation Group
UN	United Nations
UNOSOM	UN Operation Somalia
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
VMMMD	Vehicle Mounted Mine Detection System

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Since the demise of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the decade, the United States remains the only superpower in a world of increasing ethnic and religious strife and instability. An often voiced opinion among civilians and military personnel alike is that lacking the Soviet Block, the U.S. armed forces have lost their primary mission, containment of a peer competitor. Yet, while we have now lacked a true peer competitor since 1989, the touted “peace dividend” was a myth. And our mission remains, supporting U.S. interests in whatever capacity is determined by the nation.

In the July-August 1997 issue of *Military Review* Lawrence Yates illustrated that in the period from 1776 to 1997 the U.S. was involved in four “total wars” and six “limited wars,” including the American Revolution. During the same period the United States participated in at least thirty-seven military operations other than war (MOOTW). Since the writing of that article the U.S. armed forces have been involved in a half-dozen more major MOOTW missions. Throughout U.S. history MOOTW operations have outnumbered wars by a ratio of over four to one--and possibly more. Yates admitted in the article that his list was not comprehensive. Further, many postulate that the tendency to become engaged in MOOTW operations has increased dramatically in the last decade. While preparing to fight and win a major theater war is arguably our most important mission, I would argue that our primary mission--the one conducted most often--is the conduct of smaller-scale contingency operations, with peace operations assuming the lion’s share of our MOOTW commitments during the 1990s.

The U.S. policy of engagement, which provides the military's tasking to train for and conduct MOOTW missions, can be found in multiple documents. The preface of the National Security Strategy (NSS) states,

The United States remains the world's most powerful force for peace, prosperity and the universal values of democracy and freedom. Our nation's central challenge--and our responsibility--is to sustain that role by harnessing the forces of global integration for the benefit of our own people and people around the world. (White House 1999, iii)

In accordance with this precept, the U.S. has become increasingly involved in missions such as peacekeeping under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) and other multinational security arrangements. The NSS, supported by the National Military Strategy (NMS), provides this direction to all military services. Yet, writings on peace operations are normally limited to the contributions of the Army and Marine Corps units on the ground and the high visibility bombing or humanitarian missions of the U.S. Air Force. Little, if any, attention is given to the U.S. Navy's participation, or effectiveness. The resulting perception is that the U.S. Navy has avoided involvement in the peace operations arena, or is unprepared for participation in such missions altogether, with the possible exception of Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) or sanctions enforcement.

The stated objectives of the NSS are to enhance America's security, bolster America's economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights abroad (White House 1999, iii). These objectives are supported by the three elements of the NMS: shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crisis, and prepare now for the uncertain future. During the last decade the U.S. has been directly involved in multiple peacekeeping and foreign humanitarian assistance operations

(PKO/FHAO) in support of these goals. This paper will investigate the U.S. Navy's participation in three of those operations--Somalia (Operations Restore Hope, Continue Hope, and United Shield), Haiti (Operations Restore Democracy and Uphold Democracy), and the Former Yugoslavia (under UNPROFOR, IFOR/SFOR, and Operation Allied Force)--to determine what the Navy has contributed. Further, it will determine whether the U.S. Navy is prepared with the appropriate doctrine, training, and organization to sufficiently support the peacekeeping mission.

#### Policy and Guidance

The United States Navy bases operational planning on its posture statement, derived from the NMS, which in turn is derived from the NSS. In inverse order, these documents provide strategic guidance on security issues from the National Command Authorities (NCA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Department of the Navy.

#### National Security Strategy

The current version of the National Security Strategy, *A National Security Strategy For A New Century*, outlines its three main objectives as enhancing security, bolstering America's economic prosperity, and promoting democracy abroad. To achieve these objectives it proposes a "strategy of engagement" (White House 1999, 1). The NSS states that by being engaged worldwide, we significantly increase our ability to guide world events before they gain momentum against us.

The NSS explains that the U.S. intends to work cooperatively with other nations to achieve its objectives, but reserves the right to act unilaterally.

A central thrust of our strategy is to strengthen and adapt the formal relationships we have with key nations around the world, create new relationships and structures when necessary, and enhance the capability of friendly nations to exercise regional leadership in support of shared goals.

At other times, we seek to shape a favorable international environment outside of formal structures by building coalitions of like-minded nations. But we must always be prepared to act alone when it is our most advantageous course, or when we have no alternative. (White House 1999, 3)

The basis for U.S. foreign involvement in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations (FHAO) is found in the NSS's three core objectives--security, prosperity, and democracy. The NSS vision is that "the United States has close cooperative relations with the world's most influential countries, and has the ability to shape the policies and actions of those who can affect our national well-being" (White House 1999, 5). Thus, "We seek to create a stable, peaceful international security environment in which our nation, citizens and interests are not threatened" (White House 1999, 5).

Our interests abroad define the necessity of our involvement, and are broken into three levels. "Vital interests" are described as being "of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation" (White House 1999, 1). These are interests of the first order of magnitude, which call for decisive military action, unilateral if necessary. "Important national interests" are those that do not directly affect national survival, but affect our overall "well being" and the world in which we live--this is the category in which most peacekeeping operations lie. And finally, are "humanitarian and other interests." These are situations such as flooding in Bangladesh, the earthquake in Turkey, or Operation Provide Relief, the initial phase of operations in Somalia--as most PKO involve some measure of humanitarian assistance as nation building. They do not call for traditional military action, but the use of America's military forces to deliver humanitarian aid (White House 1999, 1-2).

The NSS explains that to advance our interests--as defined above--we must be ready and able to respond to threats and crises including major theater wars, transnational threats, emerging threats at home, and smaller-scale contingencies. It is these smaller-scale contingencies that have occupied most of our efforts since the end of the Gulf War, and will likely continue to be our focus in the near future.

Smaller scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, and reinforcing key allies. These operations will likely pose frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time. (White House 1999, 18)

It will often be in our national interest to proceed in partnership with others to preserve, maintain and restore peace. American participation in peace operations takes many forms, such as the NATO-led coalitions in Bosnia and Kosovo, the American-led UN force in Haiti, the Military Observer Mission Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP), our participation in the coalition operation in the Sinai, military observers in UN missions in Western Sahara, Georgia and the Middle East, and the UN mission in East Timor. (White House 1999, 18)

This focus on smaller-scale contingencies is by no means intended to give traditional warfare short shrift. The NSS states that while we will continue to engage in these types of operations, "U.S. forces must also remain prepared to withdraw from contingency operations if needed to deploy to a major theater war" (White House 1999, 18). Therefore, "U.S. forces will be kept at a high level of readiness and will be trained, equipped and organized to be capable of performing multiple missions at one time" (White House 1999, 18).

#### National Military Strategy

The National Military Strategy, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now--A Military Strategy for a New Era*, provides further direction to the Department of Defense in

accomplishing the vision set forth in the NSS. The NMS is based upon three concepts that were drawn directly from its parent document, the NSS. First, “the United States will remain globally engaged to *shape* the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests and global security.” Second, “our Armed Forces must *respond* to the full spectrum of crisis in order to protect our national interests.” Third, “as we pursue shaping and responding activities, we must also take steps to *prepare* now for an uncertain future” (NMS, see Department of Defense, 3).

The NMS recognizes that we are in an era of diminished threat of superpower confrontation, but that serious threats to security remain. “Principal among these are regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats, and ‘wild cards.’” In the face of these threats our military objectives are, “to promote peace and stability and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries” (NMS, see Department of Defense, 3).

Peacekeeping is a sub-set of the NMS objective “promote peace and stability.” The NMS provides the following four considerations to guide the use of military forces engaged in peace and stability operations. First, military force should be used judiciously and decisively. Second, we should be prepared to operate as a joint team. Third, while retaining unilateral capability, be prepared to operate in conjunction with allied or coalition forces. And finally, “ensure that the conditions necessary for terminating military involvement and withdrawing military forces are clearly established” (NMS, see Department of Defense, 8).

## Department of the Navy Posture Statement

The Department of the Navy's Posture Statement addresses how the Navy will address the goals and objectives set forth in the NSS and NMS. The most recent Navy Posture Statement edition, *Forward . . . From the Sea: Anytime, Anywhere*, states,

Continuous naval presence in critical regions worldwide provides the National Command Authorities (NCA) a wide range of military capabilities. A visible, credible force possessing deep strike, amphibious, command and control, peacekeeping, and even environmental compliance enforcement capabilities is core to this nation's standing as the preeminent superpower. Presence is the key--and naval forces provide it every day in every corner of the world.

In this passage lies the U.S. Navy's commitment to forward engagement, and specifically participation in peacekeeping operations.

### Case Studies

Operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans provide three relevant and representative examples of U.S. military assistance to international peace operations and humanitarian efforts. They were selected due the size of the operations and the amount of documentation they have generated. While several other recent MOOTW operations highlight naval participation, such as peacekeeping in East Timor and flood relief in Bangladesh, the three case studies chosen give a more balanced view of naval participation in support of the national, military, and service strategies.

#### Somalia

In 1969, on the heels of the assassination of Somalia's previous president, Rashid Ali Shirarke, Major General Muhammad Siad Barre led a bloodless coup to take control of the country. The following year Barre declared Somalia a socialist state and nationalized most of the non-agrarian economic sector. As president, Barre was the head

of a Supreme Revolutionary Council comprised of army and police officers. He selected these government sub-officials exclusively from his own Marehan clan, which infuriated the Mijertyn and Isaq clans. Subsequently, these clans began insurgencies to depose Barre. Throughout the 1980's Barre's grip on the country slipped until Barre held only Mogadishu and small sections of the provinces Hargeysa and Berbera. In 1990, the insurgent groups joined together and Barre was forced to flee the country by early 1991. The human toll of this civil war was approximately 8,000 dead.

Once Barre was deposed the factions again split. Interfaction fighting quickly broke out as each group staked its leader's claim to the presidency. During the conflict famine and disease were rampant, yet the warlords refused to allow the distribution of relief shipments. In the two years that followed Barre's abdication it is estimated that as many as 50,000 Somalis died in the fighting, while another 300,000 starved, in spite of international relief efforts that included Operation Provide Relief.

By 1992, public outcry over the deaths had risen to a level that compelled the world, and specifically the U.S., to act. President George Bush ordered Marines to land near Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, leading the way for UN peacekeeping forces who would "restore order." The Marines were eventually replaced by a larger U.S. Army presence. In 1995, U.S. servicemen were withdrawn from Somalia following the deaths of thirty Americans in fights with clan forces. Finally, U.S. Marines led a multinational amphibious withdrawal operation, completed between 28 February and 3 March 1995, that evacuated all UN forces from Somalia.

## Haiti

In March 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of Haiti, with sixty-five percent of the vote, by an internationally observed election, following the abdication of General Prosper Avril who had gained power by coup. During Aristide's tenure his drive to reform the Haitian government and military, as well as his perceived socialist tendencies, created many enemies among the Haitian elite and armed forces. In September 1991, Aristide had been deposed by another military coup--led by General Raoul Cedras--and fled to the U.S.

International outrage grew as Cedras and his chief of police, Joseph Michele Francois, ruled the nation through a dictatorship of terror. In response, the Organization of American States (OAS) and UN imposed sanctions on Haiti, to bring the military junta to the bargaining table. By 1993 UN Security Council pressure had coerced Cedras into negotiations in New York. On 3 July 1993, Cedras, clearly under pressure, submitted a proposal to step down and return Aristide to power by October of that year, but upon returning to Haiti Cedras refused to relinquish power. During October of 1993 the USS *Harlan County* arrived in Port-au-Prince harbor with an advanced party of U.S. and Canadian engineers and Special Forces. *Harlan County* departed the following day, without offloading personnel or equipment, due to a hostile demonstration of Haitians on the pier.

On 16 September 1994, a U.S. delegation including former President Jimmy Carter, former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell arrived in Haiti. Under the threat of imminent U.S. invasion, Cedras agreed to

step down. Three days later a U.S. force totaling 20,000 personnel arrived in Haiti to pave the way for a UN peacekeeping force.

#### Former Yugoslavia

Josip Broz Tito died in 1980. Tito had emerged as the leader of Yugoslavia during World War II, and had played the primary role in keeping the country united during his lifetime. In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic rose to power by discrediting and denouncing his former mentor for maintaining a weak policy on Kosovo. Two years later, at the 600th anniversary celebration of the battle of Kosovo Polje, Milosevic's speech warned other Yugoslavian ethnic groups of the Serb majority in very unsubtle terms, marking the beginning of the recent upsurge in Serb ultra-nationalism (Glenny 1993, 31-35).

In 1990, when the Yugoslavian government ended its direct rule of Bosnia, ceding power to an elected Bosnian government, so too ended the half-century respite from open conflict. The 1990 election resulted in a coalition of Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims elected to a power sharing government. However, ethnic tensions rose, fueled by Serb ultra-nationalism from the Yugoslavian government, and threats by Croatia and Slovenia to secede from Yugoslavia--which they did in June of 1991. Bosnian Serbs declared their allegiance to the Serb-controlled government of Yugoslavia, and open conflict erupted between all three factions in Bosnia, with the Yugoslavian army supporting the Serbs.

In November 1991, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) declared independence from Yugoslavia. The same month Bosnian Serbs formed a government and overwhelmingly voted to remain part of Yugoslavia. Four months later another election was held, and boycotted by Bosnian Serbs. In this election Bosnian

Muslims and Croats voted overwhelmingly for independence, which was declared shortly thereafter. Factional fighting, marked by double-crosses and brutal ethnic cleansing, tore Bosnia apart for the next four years.

The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was initially deployed to Croatia in 1992 to administer the cease-fire between Croatia and Yugoslavia. However, its responsibilities increased to include Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM when they too declared independence from Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR, with support from NATO, was charged with maintaining stability in the region from 1992 until late 1995, when an agreement was reached at the Dayton Peace Accords.

The accords called for a UN Implementation Force (IFOR) of approximately 60,000 personnel. This force was made up of troops from over twenty countries, including over 20,000 U.S. servicemen. The operation was to run from January through December 1996. However, as the deadline approached the force was renamed the UN Stabilization Force (SFOR), and it remains in place today, although in reduced numbers.

In the late 1980s, after rising to power, Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovo's regional autonomy and began a campaign of repression. In December 1992 President George Bush warned Milosevic, "The United States will respond in the event of Serb-incited violence in Kosovo" (Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, see Department of Defense 2000, 1). Kosovo tensions simmered throughout much of the decade until 1998, when Serbian repression and discrimination turned to ethnic cleansing, causing an international military response.

Kosovo is the Serbian ancestral home and the site of the historic Serb battle lost to invading Turkish forces approximately 1,000 years ago. Although it is now populated

predominantly by ethnic Albanians, the Serbs insisted that the region was “once and always Serb.” Increasing activity by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a Kosovar Albanian guerrilla group, gave the Yugoslavian Serb-led government the needed excuse to crack down on Kosovar-Albanians. This crackdown, and continued ethnic cleansing, prompted NATO action. In late March 1999, NATO forces commenced an air campaign against Yugoslavia and its forces in the region of Kosovo that would last seventy-eight days. In the end the Yugoslavian leadership capitulated and NATO forces began to arrive in Kosovo for peacekeeping duty (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, 2).

### Conclusion

These three case studies are illustrative of all U.S. PK/FHA operations in the 1990s for several reasons. First, they are worldwide, encompassing three different continents and CINCdoms. Second, they illustrate humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. And finally, they have three different geographic situations--Somalia is a coastal nation, Haiti an island nation, and Bosnia and Kosovo are inland nations. While U.S. Navy participation in these operations is not widely known, naval forces played a significant role, as will be seen in the following case studies.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses the significance of the research and the scope of discussion. It also reviews the primary literary sources utilized and provides definitions for vocabulary germane to the topic.

#### Significance

This research is important in that it reviews the conduct and participation by U.S. Navy forces in three major PKO/FHA operations conducted in the last decade. These types of missions are tasked to all U.S. armed forces in both the NSS and NMS. Additionally, the Navy Posture Statement also addresses their importance. Therefore, the U.S. Navy is responsible for maintaining an ability to conduct these missions in support of national goals. This responsibility would imply a need for sufficient training, doctrine, and structure to meet the challenges of the missions. This thesis addresses the U.S. Navy's current PKO/FHA capability by researching past operations for trends, reviewing current PKO/FHA training and doctrine, and finally discussing structure. Through this methodology it is hoped that successes and shortfalls will present themselves.

#### Scope

This thesis reviews U.S. Navy participation in operations in Somalia (Restore Hope, Continue Hope, and United Shield), Haiti (Restore Democracy and Uphold Democracy), and in the Former Yugoslavia (including support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and Implementation/Stabilization Forces (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia, and Operation Allied Force which consisted of strikes into Serbia and Kosovo). It does not discuss every instance of U.S. Navy participation, but instead attempts to give a broad

view illustrating the breadth of capabilities brought to the table. Additionally, while other services are often discussed, it is with respect to U.S. Navy support to these sister services. This support deserves special mention in the instance of the U.S. Marine Corps as it integrates many sailors into its units in support roles, including all medical personnel assigned to Marine units, who are in fact sailors. Additionally, because the Marine Corps and Navy form an amphibious team, they are often discussed in conjunction.

### Literature Review

Because the three case studies reviewed in this thesis all occurred during the last decade there is not a great deal of information available in book form. Much of the documentation discovered was in the form of periodicals, unit histories, and press releases. When reviewing the information available on current U.S. Navy training, doctrine, and structure, this lack of published analysis was further evident, and original documents were usually used as sources. Finally, several scholarly works were discovered which provided some analysis on similar or parallel topics to this thesis, and were used fairly heavily during this project. Works reviewed are organized and presented by chapter.

### Somalia

Published information documenting U.S. Navy participation in Somalia is limited. During research two books were readily available on the U.S. experience in Somalia operations, as well as several periodical articles. Much of the research information gathered was from press releases, an after action report, and a Naval Postgraduate School thesis by on Military Sealift Command's support to operations in Somalia. The best overview of U.S. Operations in Somalia is Kenneth Allard's, *Somalia Operations:*

*Lessons Learned.* The book provides an excellent source for basic information on all U.S. activities in Somalia and is divided into sections on the operational context, operational lessons learned--subdivided into planning, deployment, conduct of operations, and support--and finally, conclusions. However, because the book is a primer for all U.S. operations in Somalia, it contains little Navy specific material.

Another excellent book on Somalia is Mark Bowden's *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*. The book studies the Battle of Mogadishu that occurred on 3 and 4 October 1993 in a narrative format. Because the book is specific to that action, which was primarily a U.S. Army effort, discussion of U.S. Navy assistance is limited to mention of a P-3 providing directional assistance to the rescue party from overhead the battle.

Periodical coverage is also sparse. The July 1996 issue of *Naval Aviation News* contained the article, "1995 the Year in Review," which discussed the participation of USS *Belleau Wood* and USS *Essex* in Operation Untied Shield, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. And, in the May 1995 issue of *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Captain K. L. Eichelberger, USN, discussed the difficulty in maintaining naval "corporate knowledge" on the JTF Somalia staff, in "Making the Navy's Case in Somalia."

An exceptionally useful document was John J. McGrath's Naval Postgraduate School thesis, "A History of Sealift and Force Sustainment Operations during the Somalia Intervention (1992-1994)." This paper was invaluable in researching U.S. Navy contributions to the overall effort.

The final, and most valuable asset, for researching Navy specific activities was the Chief of Naval Information's Navy News Service web page (<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/navnews/www/navnews.html>). This page provides a year-by-year directory for all Navy News Service press releases going back to 1993. While it was utilized extensively for all case studies in this thesis, it was especially valuable in the case of Somalia.

#### Haiti

*Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti~A Case Study*, edited by Dr. Margaret Daley Hayes and RADM Gary Wheatley, USN (Ret.), is the result of a workshop that was conducted by the National Defense University's Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT). ACT's primary responsibility is to develop approaches to critical operational problems of command and control. As such, the publication provides a quick walkthrough of the events leading up to Operation Uphold Democracy and the operation itself. It then reviews the reasons the operation was successful, discusses the interagency coordination problems experienced, and lessons learned. While the publication does not provide in-depth coverage of the events in Haiti, it does give an excellent introduction, and is a good tool for reviewing command and control concerns during multi-agency operations, which was the publication's primary purpose.

*The Immaculate Invasion*, by Bob Shacochis, is a first-hand account of the events in Haiti. Shacochis, a contributing writer to several national periodicals including *Gentlemen's Quarterly*, spent eighteen months in Haiti with U.S. forces and writes fairly captivately of his experience. However, because of Shacochis' limited exposure to the

armed forces and military operations he often makes mistakes when delving into specifics. Also, because much of his time was spent with U.S. Army special operations units, his writings reflect a bias towards their viewpoint--not to imply by any means that that is an all-bad thing. Shacochis does provide an interesting viewpoint as an outsider and well-written journalistic approach.

*Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion:" A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, by Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, is an outstanding source of information on Haitian operations, providing excellent background as well as mission specifics. Because it focuses on the U.S. Army, discussion of U.S. Navy participation is fairly limited. However, due to the presence and involvement of U.S. Army personnel, it provides an excellent review of the USS *Harlan County* incident.

The final book on the Haitian operation is *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*, by John R. Ballard. Ballard is a professor of Military History and Strategy at the Armed Forces Staff College of the National Defense University. During operation Uphold Democracy he served as a member of the U.S. Atlantic Command--now Joint Forces Command--staff, and deployed to Haiti for part of the operation. The book begins with an overview of Haitian history and the contingency planning that led up to the operation. Ballard then discussed both JTF-180 and JTF-190--the task forces formed to achieve lodgments in hostile and non-hostile environments, respectively--as well as the UN mission to Haiti, which followed the U.S. forces. As both a staff member and historian Ballard is equipped to create a definitive broad history of the operation, and the work reflects his potential.

Specific recounting of Haitian events can also be found in periodicals, such as an article entitled “The *USS Harlan County* Affair,” published in the July-August 1997 issue of *Military Review*. In this article, Lieutenant Commander Peter J. A. Riehm provided a synopsis of the events and issues surrounding the *USS Harlan County* incident. During this incident a U.S. Navy ship carrying approximately 200 U.S. and Canadian military personnel, leading a UN peacekeeping mission, was turned away from the pier at Port-au-Prince by gun toting thugs. Riehm’s article draws from his own experience in the operation, as well as interviews of other senior officers involved. Among them are: retired Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Baker, who was the commander if U.S. peacekeeping forces onboard the *Harlan County*; Colonel J. G. Pulley, Commander of Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF HAG); and Commander Marvin E. Butcher, Commanding Officer of *Harlan County*. The article provides both an “insider’s view” historical account, and an analysis of the apparently surreal policy vacuum that surrounded the entire operation.

“Flexibility, Reach, and Muscle: How Army Helicopters On a Navy Carrier Succeeded in Haiti,” by Colonel Lawrence E. Casper, U.S. Army, appeared in the January 1995 issue of *Armed Forces Journal International*. In the article Colonel Casper, who was the commander of the 10th Mountain Division’s aviation brigade, discussed the unusual tasking to deploy on U.S. Navy ships to Operation Uphold Democracy. He then explains that within days his command had melded virtually seamlessly with the *USS Theodore Roosevelt* for training, then the *USS Dwight D. Eisenhower* for operational deployment as part of TF-190. Although brief, the article

provides key insights on the ability of military professionals to work well together, in conditions outside of their normal comfort zone, to mutual benefit.

An especially valuable document utilized in research of U.S. Navy contributions to Haitian operations was a 1997 M.M.A.S. thesis by Donald J. Hurley, entitled "The Effectiveness of Naval Intelligence Support to the 10th Mountain Division Units Embarked on the USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69), 14 through 21 September 1994." This document provided a great deal of insight to the operation and how to achieve joint effectiveness. Additionally, I often found myself referring to the work for format and content pointers--for which I owe Hurley my thanks.

#### Former Yugoslavia

The Government Accounting Office's *Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness on U.N. Operations in Bosnia* is another book that provides an overview of all U.S. operations within a theater. Like the others discussed it contains a great deal of information on U.S. operations in Bosnia, but little on U.S. Navy operations.

*Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower*, by Tim Ripley, offers a heavy dose of color photographs, and at first glance appears to be a coffee-table book on air power. However, Mr. Ripley does a very good job documenting the historical contributions of each allied nation's air forces during operations in Bosnia until 1996. And as such, discusses U.S. naval air forces--both carrier and land based--which helped bring about and enforce the peace in Bosnia.

Additionally, periodical articles and web pages provided useful avenues of research. "Seabees in Bosnia," by Lieutenant Commander John W. Korka and Major Dan Worth, appeared in the April-May 1998 issue of *The Military Engineer*. The article

documents the participation of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion One in Operation Joint Guard. The article provided a brief glimpse at the high points of the unit's deployment under the operational control of the Army's 16th Engineer Battalion, assigned to Task Force Eagle. Finally, the Seabee History section of the Naval Historical Center web site (<http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq67-7.htm>) provides accounts of Seabee participation to both IFOR and SFOR operations in 1995 and 1996. Included in this history are the contributions of NMCBs 133 and 40, who operated in Croatia, Bosnia, and Hungary, conducting a wide variety of construction missions.

### Analysis

The final chapter of this thesis looks at current U.S. Navy training, doctrine, and structure with respect to its preparedness for the conduct of peace operations. The primary sources for this research were joint and navy doctrinal publications and texts that are discussed in the actual chapter, thus a review would be redundant. However, three thesis authored by other officers were cited heavily in my discussion, and helped immensely in focusing my thinking. First was Commander Flemming Barns' Naval War College thesis, "Peace Operations and the Naval Services: Reengineering the Commitment or Business as Usual" which focused heavily on patrol craft, but contained very good insight on naval participation in peace operations. Second was USMC Major Alvah E. Ingersoll III's Naval War College thesis, "A Naval Expeditionary Task-Group in Operations Other Than War which provided interesting "out of the box" task group organization ideas. Finally was LCDR Thomas A. Cropper's Naval War College thesis, "From the Sea . . . From the CV: Do Carriers Really Contribute to Peace Operations"

which focussed on CVBG's in peace operations but also showed insight and spurred ideas.

### Definitions

Humanitarian Assistance (HA). Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designated to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance (JP 3-07.3, see Department of Defense 1999).

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during and after war (Joint Publication [JP] 3-07, see Department of Defense 1999).

Peace Building. Post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07.3, see Department of Defense, GL-7).

Peace Enforcement (PE). Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (JP 3-07.3, see Department of Defense 1999, GL-7).

Peace Keeping (PK). Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (JP 3-07.3, see Department of Defense 1999, GL-8).

Peace Making. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it (JP 3-07.3, see Department of Defense 1999, GL-8).

Peace Operations (PO). A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace (JP 3-07.3, see Department of Defense 1999, GL-8).

## CHAPTER 3

### SOMALIA

#### Introduction

This chapter discusses U.S. Navy operations in support of humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia from 1992 to 1995. It is divided into three sections paralleling the final three, of four operations that comprised the entire Somalia experience. It was during these latter three operations that the U.S. Navy efforts greatly enhanced the success of the humanitarian mission. The U.S. Navy's contributions included transport, construction, water supply, special operations assistance, and medical support.

The first mission to aid the Somalis was Operation Provide Relief--or UN Operation Somalia (UNOSOM). Provide Relief began in August 1992, and was primarily a humanitarian supply mission using military airlift. U.S. Air Force C-130s were forward deployed to Kenya, and comprised the majority of the U.S. contribution. By December 1992 it was apparent that the relief supplies were being controlled by Somali warlords, and not getting to the impoverished Somalis who needed them. In response to the growing crisis the UN approved follow-on missions, with the assigned task of protecting humanitarian supplies. The result was a two-phased operation.

The first phase was conducted by an U.S. led coalition, designated Operation Restore Hope. During this phase all major Somali distribution arteries were to be seized, and an infrastructure created to ensure adequate distribution of relief supplies. At the completion of Restore Hope the U.S. forces would turn control of the effort over to the UN (UNOSOM II), and Operation Continue Hope would commence. This turnover was conducted in May 1993. Continue Hope lasted until March 1995, and was marked by the

3 through 4 October 1993 engagement of Task Force Ranger. The fourth and final phase of U.S. activity in Somalia was Operation United Shield. United Shield was an amphibious withdrawal of U.S. and UN forces from Somalia and was concluded on 3 March 1995.




Figure 2. CIA Map of Somalia (Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection)

### Operation Restore Hope

Operation Restore Hope's planners intended to initiate the operation with an amphibious assault on key points within the city of Mogadishu. The Amphibious Task Unit (ATU) that conducted the operation consisted of amphibious ships USS *Tripoli* (LPH-10), USS *Juneau* (LPD-10), USS *Rushmore* (LSD-47), and MV *Luminous*, a contracted Maritime Pre-Positioning Ship (MPS) ordinarily assigned to Maritime Pre-Positioning Squadron Three (MPSRON-3) in Guam. *Luminous* was required because the ATU was missing two of its doctrinally assigned ships, and the *Luminous* made up partly for the shortfall in equipment. This was the first time a MPS ship deployed with amphibious warships, in what is called a "three plus one" combination. The ATU departed for Somalia on 30 November 1992, with an embarked contingent of 1,800 Marines (McGrath 1996, 16).

On 4 December, President George Bush publicly ordered a "substantial American force" into Somalia, and USCENTCOM released its OPORDER the following day. Upon receipt, the commander of MPSRON TWO ordered his three MPS ships, in Diego Garcia, to deploy immediately. MVs *Anderson*, *Bonnyman*, and *Phillips* left for Mogadishu that day, with the Commodore and his staff embarked, as well as the Offload Preparation Parties (OPPs), who had arrived in Diego Garcia on 4 December. Their 1,900 nautical mile journey was completed in six days (McGrath 1996, 20).

On 5 December, the *Tripoli* ATU arrived off Mogadishu and began preparations for the Special Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) landing. Operation Restore Hope officially began on the morning of 9 December, with the landing of the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEU [SOC]). These Marines simultaneously secured both Mogadishu's airport and port facilities (McGrath 1996, 20).

After the initial Marine landing, the survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party (SLRP), comprised mainly of Coast Guard and Navy Reserve personnel, was flown to the port facility where it was met by a U.S. Navy SEAL detachment from USS *Tripoli*. Together they completed a detailed hydrographic survey of the harbor, ensuring the feasibility of an MPS "pierside" offload. In spite of the rusting and rotting vessels and debris present, the survey, completed on 10 December, showed that it was possible (McGrath 1996, 21-23).

Port operations began when 1st Force Service Group, Forward (1st FSSG [Forward]), in conjunction with the MPS OPPs, conducted the MPS offload, and established the port of Mogadishu as the supply hub for southern Somalia. The FSSG was the Marine force's combat logistical support element, and was responsible for providing logistical support to all military forces in the operation. This unit included a number of Navy personnel who were key to the success of the operation. The unit performed remarkably well, considering it was based in Mogadishu, as were most of the U.S. and coalition troops, and provided support to forces up to 350 miles away, far superceding the 55-mile Marine Corps doctrine (McGrath 1996, 21-23).

A shining example of Navy support was the FSSG's 1st Dental Battalion (DENBN). This unit was a detachment of nine dental officers and seventeen dental technicians, led by Commander H. H. Fischer, and was in Somalia from December 1992 through February 1993. The DENBN's primary tasking was to provide emergency dental care to U.S., coalition, and NGO (Non-Government Organization) personnel. During

their deployment the DENBN sailors overcame daunting equipment and environment problems. Many of the storage containers delivered by MPSs were missing mandatory dental items, which in turn mandated field improvisation and repairs to the then irreplaceable damaged instruments. Further, the dental clinic was run from a canvas tent that was not designed to keep out sand and dust, and reached alarming temperatures during the day. In spite of the hardships faced, 1st DENBN provided quality emergency care to approximately 300 personnel, including members of all four DOD services, Coast Guard personnel, and thirty-six NGO and Coalition personnel (Fischer 1993).

Another innovative use of naval assets in support of ground operations was born of necessity. Early estimates of water usage were far lower than actual requirements in Somalia. There were no sources of potable water in Somalia, as even the wells had been polluted, and the U.S. Army Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) barge did not arrive in theater until day fifty of the operation. Consequently, field ROWPUs could not keep pace. To meet the shortfall MPS ships would sortie daily to make fresh water at sea, then discharge it to 1st FSSG water bladders on Green Beach using the Amphibious Assault Buoyant Water System (AABWS), essentially a buoyant hose. For approximately a month each ship produced about 50,000 gallons of potable water per day. This totaled one third of all water production, still barely meeting the operation's requirements (McGrath 1996, 27 and 68).

As preparations were made in the U.S. to deploy Army units to Somalia, eight roll-on/roll-off ships (RO/ROs) were tasked to conduct the deployment of the Army equipment. These ships included MVs *American Eagle* and *American Falcon*--both chartered--and six Fast Sealift Ships (FSS): USNS *Pollux*, *Altair*, *Algol*, *Capella*,

*Bellatrix*, and *Denebola*. Seven of these ships departed for Somalia during the last week in December (McGrath 1996, 27).

In Somalia, improvements to the facilities continued as Captain Alee, MPSRON-2 commodore, directed his operations officer to designate anchorages and devise a "Mogadishu Port Control" watchbill. The arrival of tugboats *Fast Fax* and *Smit-Lloyd 111* by late December, combined with four Military Sealift Command (MSC) leased vessels, brought Mogadishu Port Control's tug fleet to six (McGrath 1996, 29). Thus, port development efforts were well established when the first Army units arrived in Somalia.

The U.S. Army 4th Transportation Battalion of the 7th Transportation Group (7th TRANS) advanced party arrived in Mogadishu on 21 December to consult with the MPS staff, commencing the transference of responsibility for port operations to the Army. Before responsibility for port control was turned over to Colonel Leyben, 7th TRANS commanding officer, on day thirty-five of the operation, the MPS force had successfully completed the following:

1. Conducted the movement of 114 ships and off load of 48.
2. Completed the offload of 96 helicopters, and 6,668 other military vehicles.
3. Offloaded 37,500 metric tons of grain from 14 relief ships.
4. Delivered a total of 113,950 metric tons of cargo (averaging 3,250 per day).
5. Completed the discharge of 5,220,000 gallons of fuel ashore (McGrath 1996, 29, 30 and 35).

U.S. Navy Seabees provided invaluable support throughout Operation Restore Hope. They were represented in Somalia by Amphibious Construction Battalion One,

and Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB) One and Forty--together the two NMCBs comprised the 30th Naval Construction regiment (Operational) (Naval Historical Center 1999). Seabees went ashore during the initial stages of Restore Hope to provide construction support to the U.S. contingent. Their primary tasking was to provide "vertical construction" support to U.S. and coalition forces, and establish base camps at each humanitarian relief site. They built restroom facilities, showers, tent decks, "strongback" tents, and kitchens (Naval Historical Center 1999).

Within the city of Mogadishu Seabees conducted Operation "Clean Sweep," the removal of debris such as trash and car hulks from the tactically critical areas of the city. They prepared the site of a 300-bed Army evacuation hospital, and added 90,000 square feet of airfield to the Mogadishu airport. Also, they were instrumental in unloading five of the MPS ships, and providing fuel and water for the military forces in Somalia (Naval Historical Center 1999).

Seabee contributions outside of Mogadishu were equally important. By the end of December, Seabees from NMCB 1 were convoying personnel and equipment to Baledogle, Bardera, and Baïdoa to repair and improve the airfields and construct base camps for the deploying UN coalition forces. In conjunction with Marines from Marine Support Wing Squadron 372, Seabees established landing and staging areas for CH-53 helicopters, and a taxiway and turnaround pad for C-130 aircraft, in Baledogle. They used 240,000 square feet of AM2 metal matting to construct the facility (Naval Historical Center 1999). Near Bardera, Seabees restored water to a refugee camp by installing a new pump on the bank of the Jubba River. They also repaired and improved the main supply routes, including bridge repairs and shoulder grading to widen the roads. The

largest Seabee project was the Baidoa airstrip. This field had deteriorated early in the relief operation due to C-130 usage. The project included removing 300,000 square feet of asphalt surface, pulverizing and mixing it with Portland cement, and then relaying, grading, and compacting the mixture. Additionally, over 600,000 square feet of AM2 matting was installed for aircraft turnarounds, parking aprons, and helicopter landing pads. In a humanitarian function Seabees drilled wells, constructed a seven-room schoolhouse, and repaired hospitals and orphanages (Naval Historical Center 1999 and CJTF Somalia 1993).

Seabees participated in an amphibious landing at the Port of Kismayo where they repaired the airfield, allowing the deployment of follow-on coalition forces to that city. By the end of March 1993, Seabees had completed all of their Restore Hope tasking--in addition to multiple civil-service projects--and returned to their previous deployment sites and homeports (Naval Historical Center 1999).

Several units and Sailors involved in Operation Restore Hope received special recognition for their actions. USS *Tripoli* was awarded the 1992 National Defense Transportation Association Award for her amazing operational and logistical contributions to the operation. While operating off Somalia she had accomplished the following: 4,980 sorties were flown from her deck, including sixty-two emergency medical evacuations; 10,578 passengers were moved; 288,250 pounds of mail were transferred, and 414,000 gallons of fuel were provided to over 1,500 aircraft, without a single human or aircraft casualty (Wells 1993). Additionally, Equipment Operator First Class Kelly J. Ryan received the 1993 Marvin Shields Award, awarded for exceptional contribution to military construction, for his work with NMCB 40 while deployed to

Somalia and Guam (Navy News Service [NNS] 344, see "1993 Marvin Shields Award Winner Announced" 1994).

#### Operation Continue Hope

Operation Continue Hope began on 4 May 1993, when UNOSOM II assumed responsibility for the relief mission. UNOSOM II would eventually "fail" for multiple interrelated reasons, including dissimilar command structures, decreased firepower (with the departure of the SPMAGTF), increased Somali hostility, and mission creep--the tasking was broadened to include offensive operations. In spite of the eventual cessation of the operation, the U.S. and UN forces within Somalia accomplished a great number of missions that improved the lives of Somalis. Following is a summary of U.S. Navy contributions to that effort.

One of the first U.S. missions in support of UNOSOM II was another amphibious landing. In this operation a CENTCOM assigned Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)--consisting of the ships USS *Wasp* (LHD 1), USS *Barnstable County* (LST 1197), USS *El Paso* (LKA 117), USS *Nashville* (LPD 13), the embarked 24th MEU (SOC), and Sailors--landed in Bosaaso, Somalia, on 9 July 1993. While the primary mission was to deliver and protect humanitarian relief to the city in northern Somalia, additional tasks were completed through the cooperation of Marines and assigned Navy personnel. Fleet Surgical Team Six--a Navy element--went ashore to assist medical personnel assigned to the 24th MEU (SOC)--all corpsmen and doctors assigned to Marine units are actually U.S. Navy personnel. Together they provided basic medical treatment to Somalis in the Bosaaso region. Three doctors and twenty-three corpsmen treated 241 Somalis, including twenty-six dental patients, over the two days of the operation. Additionally,

three construction projects were conducted: the building of a new port administration building for Bosaaso (the major port for northern Somalia), renovation of the police station, and the expansion and repair of a road from the airport to the town (CTF One Five Six Public Affairs 1993).

Immediately following the clash between Task Force Ranger and Somalis, on 3 and 4 October 1993, the U.S. dramatically increased force levels in Somalia, to improve force protection capability, and “send a message.” This engagement had cost eighteen soldiers their lives, while over seventy others were wounded. Five U.S. Navy SEALs later received Silver Stars for their actions under fire during attempts to relieve the besieged Task Force (NNS 239, see “Silver Star Awarded to SEALs for Somalia Action.” 1994). Of additional note, the Navy’s MSC later named two large, medium-speed, roll on/roll off (LMSR) ships after Soldiers who earned posthumous Medals of Honor in the engagement, Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon, and Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shugart. In both a literal and metaphoric sense *Gordon* (T-AKR 296) and *Shugart* (T-AKR 295) will continue “carrying the loads” of their fellow soldiers for decades to come (NNS 158, see “SECNAV Names New Roll On/Roll Off Ships.” 1995).

The U.S. Navy was in position to quickly assemble and deliver a large portion of this mandated force increase. USS *Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72) and her escort USS *Chandler* (DDG 996) were conducting operations off Somalia five days after receiving orders to leave the Persian Gulf, on 7 October--these operations included low-level overflights of Somalia by the tactical aircraft of *Lincoln*’s embarked carrier air wing. On 17 October, five days later, two ARGs arrived on scene. The *Guadalcanal* ARG was made up of the forces of Amphibious Squadron Eight, including USS *Guadalcanal* (LPH

7), USS *Shreveport* (LPD 12), USS *Ashland* (LSD 48), and the 22nd MEU (SOC). The *New Orleans* ARG was made up of the forces of Amphibious Squadron Five, including USS *New Orleans* (LPH 11), USS *Denver* (LPD 9), USS *Comstock* (LSD 45), USS *Cayuga*, and the 13th MEU (SOC) (NNS 799, see "... From the Sea, the Navy and Marine Corps in Action 1993, COMUSNAVCENT Public Affairs 13 October 1993, and COMUSNAVCENT Public Affairs 20 October 1993). When *Lincoln* and *Chandler* returned to their homeports, U.S. Navy carrier presence was continued with the arrival of USS *America* (CV 66), her escort USS *Simpson* (FFG 56), and the oiler USS *Savannah* (AOR 4), in late October (CINCLANTFLT Public Affairs 1993).

One month later, 300 Sailors and Marines from *New Orleans* conducted a three-day medical and dental humanitarian mission in Marka, Somalia (COMPHIBRON Five Public Affairs 1993). Later, U.S. Navy humanitarian missions would expand within the area. On 3 May 1994, Marines and Sailors from Marine Service Support Group (MSSG) 11 and USS *Duluth*, conducted a medical and dental civic action in Kipini, Kenya. While there, they provided aid to over 300 Kenyans, and filled almost 500 prescriptions (USS *Duluth* Public Affairs 1994). During November of 1994 the Navy provided assistance to the disabled Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, which was discovered burning 130 miles off the coast of Somalia. The initial Navy asset on scene was a P-3 surveillance aircraft. Subsequently, the P-3's crew provided a live CNN report on the efforts of civilian ships to conduct a rescue, as the aircraft orbited overhead the vessels. USS *Gettysburg* (CG 64) and USS *Halyburton* sped to the scene and used their embarked helicopters to shuttle medical supplies and food to evacuated passengers aboard the civilian vessels (NNS 000, see "U.S. Navy Enroute to Burning Cruise Ship" 1994).

U.S. Army Soldiers directly benefited from U.S. Navy assistance as well. One example is the 20 December 1993 rescue of two Soldiers trapped in a Highly Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (“HUMVEE”) by Chief Warrant Officer Robert Miller and Petty Officer Third Class Paul Lynch, Jr. When the Soldiers’ HUMVEE was crushed between two trailer trucks, the Sailors were promptly flown in from USS *New Orleans*. They then used the “jaws of life” to cut through the vehicle’s one-inch frame and Kevlar seat armor trapping the Soldiers (Lawson 1993). A less dramatic, but still interesting, example of Navy support to the Army was a program established by the USS *America* First Class Association. This program afforded Soldiers in the field a twenty-four-hour break from their environment. Soldiers were flown to *America* by her embarked helicopter squadron, then given a tour of the ship, three hot meals, and a bunk. Soldiers were afforded the opportunity to visit the ship’s store, work out, watch television, and take a shower. Feedback from the Soldiers who participated was very positive (USS *America* Public Affairs 1993). Finally, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command obtained the services of MV *Mediterranean Sky* and T/S *Empire State*--the State University of New York Maritime College’s training ship--to ferry Soldiers from Somalia to Mombasa, Kenya, the site from which they were flown home. This was the first use of civilian-operated ships to transport American forces since the Vietnam War (Rosas 1994).

#### Operation United Shield

The final phase of U.S. operations in Somalia was the evacuation of all UN forces under the auspices of the U.S. led Operation United Shield. This operation was the first amphibious withdrawal since the evacuation of Inchon during the Korean War. The Task Force conducting the operation was comprised of units from all U.S. forces as well as

personnel from Great Britain, Pakistan, Italy, France, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. Over 14,000 individuals on twenty-three warships participated, but two U.S. amphibious groups conducted the “heavy lifting.” Two thousand Marines and Sailors from the *Essex* ARG--USS *Essex* (LHD 2), USS *Fort Fisher* (LSD 40), USS *Ogden* (LPD 5), and the 13th MEU (SOC)--and USS *Belleau Wood* (LHA 3), with an embarked SPMAGTF, conducted coordinated operations, seizing the Somali New Port and Green Beach. These operations relieved the Pakistani and Bangladeshi troops encamped in the vicinity of those locations (Canedo 1995 and Walters and Burgess 1996). Operation United Shield was successfully completed during a seventy-two-hour period, from 28 February to 3 March. Later, Secretary of Defense William Perry would remark, “We live in an imperfect world. And we can never make it perfect. But we can attain moments of perfection. Operation United Shield was such a moment” (NNS 166, see “Withdrawal of UNOSOM II Forces from Somalia Completed.” 1995 and NNS 210, see “Notable Quotable” 1995).

### Conclusion

U.S. Navy contributions in Somalia included diverse missions such as transport (ninety-five percent of all U.S. equipment traveled by sea), construction services, and tactical air support. In that Somalia is a coastal country, one can see obvious opportunity for U.S. Navy participation in operations regional operations. Yet, the breadth and depth of participation achieved is somewhat startling. Navy operations were conducted on land, sea, and in the air, and they continued throughout Operations Restore Hope, Continue Hope, and United Shield. The rapid, professional, and often innovative,

contributions of U.S. Navy personnel were invaluable to the conduct of the U.S. missions in Somalia.

## CHAPTER 4

### HAITI

#### Introduction

This chapter provides a history of U.S. Navy participation in U.S. Haitian operations--the cancelled Restore Democracy, and executed Uphold Democracy--from 1994 to 1997. Navy participation in these operations included, but was not limited to, transport of forces and equipment, construction, intelligence support, command, control, communications, computers, and information (C4I), special operations, and medical support.

The history of U.S., and specifically U.S. Navy, intervention in Haiti in this century dates back to 1915, when U.S. Marines were sent to counter political instability and the growing influence of the Germans and French in the region, perceived to be a threat to the Panama Canal. Because Haiti is an island nation in close proximity to the U.S., the Navy-Marine Corps team was the ideal enabling tool to implement the U.S. intervention. The U.S. occupation ended in 1934, when government was turned back over to the Haitians. The Haitian government switched hands multiple times over the next several decades, rotating between elected presidents and military juntas.

The 3 July 1993 Governor's Island Accords, brokered by the Organization of American States (OAS), was an agreement to return control of Haiti's government from one of those military juntas back to democratically elected officials. Specifically, General Raoul Cedras agreed to return control to Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been ousted by a Cedras led coup in September 1991, seven months after Aristide was legally elected president.




Figure 2. CIA Map of Haiti (Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection)

#### Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group

To assist in the transfer of power, the U.S., as a member of the OAS, opted to send the specially created JTF HAG, to facilitate the turnover between the two parties. JTF HAG was organized under the direction of the U.S. Atlantic Command Commander-in-Chief (CINCLANT), Admiral Paul Miller. JTF HAG was composed of U.S. and Canadian engineers and U.S. Special Forces personnel. The task force's mission was to lay the groundwork for the return of Aristide by engaging in high-visibility Haitian assistance operations.

A new and innovative concept for task force packaging, called “the adaptive joint force package (AJFP),” guided the planners for Haitian operations. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had created AJFP when he called for appropriately tailored joint task forces to respond to emerging crisis in the 1992 National Military Strategy (Hurley 1997, 2). Under AJFP elements were taken from each service to meet the specific needs of an operation, with more regard given to capability than precedent (Shacochis 1999, 53).

USACOM had conducted four AJFP experiments before Uphold Democracy. The first two entailed deploying Marines aboard aircraft carriers. In March 1993, a 200-Marine reinforced rifle company with ten Marine helicopters--600 Marines total--embarked aboard USS *Theodore Roosevelt* for a Mediterranean and Arabian Gulf deployment. To create the required room for the Marines *Theodore Roosevelt* removed both an F-14 Tomcat squadron and S-3B Viking squadron from its embarked airwing. Later that year, USS *America* deployed with a similar Marine helicopter contingent. The latter two experiments involved deploying U.S. Army forces with carrier battle groups (CVBGs). In 1994, USS *Saratoga* conducted predeployment training with an embarked Special Operations Force (SOF) command-and-control element, and a Space Command support team. That same year USS *George Washington* conducted predeployment training with a company of Army Rangers (and supporting U.S. Army helicopters) embarked. During the experiment the Rangers flew training missions from *Washington*'s flight deck (Hurley 1997, 2-3, and Goodman 1994, 12). These successful experiments set the tone for the innovative thinking that would guide the planning for Haitian operations, and the U.S. Navy participation in them. For “[Admiral Miller] advocated using U.S.

military capability for tasks other than those with a strictly military application, especially for the Haitis of the world" (Shacochis 1999, 55).

JTF HAG was comprised of U.S. and Canadian service members, including "subject matter experts" from all services. U.S. Army Colonel J. G. Pulley, then commander of 7th Special Forces Group, was chosen to command JTF HAG. Two U.S. Navy Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs), USS *Harlan County* and USS *Fairfax County*, were selected to transport the JTF to Haiti. USS *Harlan County* departed first with 225 JTF HAG personnel aboard, including staff and operational elements (Riehm 1997, 32). *Harlan County* stopped en route to Haiti at the U.S. Naval Station in Roosevelt Roads Puerto Rico to embark a U.S. Navy construction battalion, known as Seabees, as well as Canadian engineers (Kretchik et. al. 1998, 37).

The mission of the *Harlan County* changed dramatically on 3 October 1993, when eighteen U.S. Army soldiers were killed, and thirty-one others injured, in Mogadishu, Somalia. The video of the American's bodies being mutilated shocked and horrified American citizens, and created a new climate for the Haitian operation. Haitian forces loyal to Cedras realized that if they could convince Americans that Haiti was another potential Somalia, they could possibly stop U.S. involvement. U.S. military planners realized the same possibility, and shied from the risks of an opposed landing, which could create those casualties (Kretchik et. al. 1998, 37).

When *Harlan County* arrived in Port-au-Prince harbor on 11 October 1993 there was a maze of Haitian vessels anchored in the harbor's channels, which appeared to be a deliberate attempt to prevent or slow her arrival. *Harlan County* maneuvered around the anchored vessels but was unable to dock because a Cuban tanker filled her assigned birth

(Kretchik et. al. 1998, 38). *Harlan County*'s story then become a tragic-comedy of "he-said, she-said," with a half-dozen major actors.

Several of *Harlan County*'s embarked boats deployed to survey the situation on the pier, as well as provide security for the anchored ship. A mob of Haitians recruited and paid by the Front for Revolution and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH)--a Cedras loyalist organization--was demonstrating ashore, and several Haitian small-boats, both official and unofficial, approached *Harlan County* brandishing weapons. *Harlan County*'s Commanding Officer, Commander Marvin E. Butcher, surveyed the situation from the harbor and felt it was imprudent to force the landing. U.S. Army Colonel J. G. Pulley who was ashore, felt the landing could be made safely because the FRAPH demonstrators, who were obviously disorganized and drunk, would disperse. The situation was compounded when the U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Nikki Huddleston, arrived on scene from the embassy, then retreated when FRAPH demonstrators began beating her car with ax handles. To complete the irony, it was later revealed, during a *60 Minutes* interview with FRAPH leader Emmanuel Constant, that FRAPH had been at least partially supported by the CIA, and had previously notified the embassy of the demonstration. After much discussion, *Harlan County* weighed anchor the following day and returned to Puerto Rico, somewhat sadly ending the first chapter of U.S. Navy participation in Haitian operations (Kretchik et. al. 1998, 38-41, Shacochis 1999, 33 and Stotzky 1997, 169-171). A project had been scheduled for Seabees and Canadian engineers to renovate a local school in concert with Haitian laborers on the following day. Instead, the only U.S. Navy activity was the quick turnaround of a U.S. Navy C-9

Nightingale aircraft, as it delivered reinforcements to the embassy's Marine security force, and retrieved the JTF HAG advanced party (Shacochis 1999, 33).

Cedras likely viewed *Harlan County*'s "retreat" as proof of weakened U.S. resolve, and he declined to resign as required by the Governor's Island Accords. On 13 October the UN Security Council approved an oil and arms embargo on Haiti, as Cedras' campaign of government sponsored violence continued (Hayes and Wheatley 1996, 11 and Stotzky 1997, 35). From October 1993 to July 1994 international pressure built against the Cedras controlled government, and U.S. resolve hardened.

#### Shipborne Support

By July 1994, elements of a multinational force were training in Puerto Rico to support the future, and inevitable, military operation to remove Cedras and restore Aristide, as U.S. Army and Navy units conducted exercises off Haiti and Florida. U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels conducted Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), to prevent violations of the UN ordered Haitian embargo. Additionally, the USS *Inchon* Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which carried the 24th MEU (SOC), deployed to Haitian waters, as an additional signal to Cedras of U.S. resolve (Hayes and Wheatley 1996, 14-15).

Events accelerated during July 1994. On 12 July, Cedras ordered the 100-man UN and OAS human-rights monitor team, reporting violations of Haitian rights, to leave the country. That same day the U.S. Second Fleet command ship, USS *Mount Whitney*, sailed for the Haitian area of operations (Ballard 1998, 86). Admiral Miller had directed Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, Commander of the U.S. Army's XVIII Airborne Corps, who would command the Haitian invasion, to use *Mount Whitney* and her

sophisticated command and control suite to conduct the operation, over some hesitation from Shelton who felt his place was in the field (Shacochis 1999, 56-57).

“On 31 July, the UN Security Council authorized use of ‘all necessary means’ to restore Aristide to his elected position and authorized the creation of a multinational force for that purpose” (Hayes and Wheatley 1996, 15). Although the Clinton Administration declined to give a specific deadline for Cedras’ resignation, and repeatedly stated its hope that military force would not be necessary, planning for military action was given further impetus. A National Defense University study reported that the planning was “dual-tracked” and included opposed and unopposed options, Plans 2370 and 2380, respectively (Hayes and Wheatley 1996, 14-15). In a 1994 interview, Captain Timothy Pendergast, USN, who was directly involved in the planning, stated that the actual planning had begun immediately after the departure of *Harlan County*, and that planners were obsessed with the ship’s perceived failure. “Over and over I heard planners say, ‘we don’t want 2380 to be another *Harlan County*’” (Ballard 1998, 56).

On 9 September 1994 Admiral Miller activated seven Military Sealift Command roll-on, roll-off (RO/RO) ships--used for bulk shipment, and specifically for equipment used by an invasion force. This move was an “attention getter” for some planners who were still not convinced the operation would actually occur (Ballard 1998, 101). Additionally, the hospital ship USS *Comfort* was dispatched to support the joint task force. The activation of this reserve unit, one of only two hospital ships in the Navy, further evidenced U.S. determination, and the abandonment of the “no-casualties mentality” (Ballard 1998, 91). Incidentally, the presence of USS *Comfort* would later

save the life of American photo-journalist Lee Celano, who was evacuated to *Comfort* for brain surgery after he was shot in the head by a disgruntled Haitian (Shacochis 1999, 68).

On 10 September soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division--who comprised JTF 190, the unopposed entry option--embarked aboard USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* in Norfolk Virginia. Concurrently, members of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) were assembling aboard USS *America* (Ballard 1998, 188). Both ships deployed for the then imminent Haitian “invasion” on 14 September. On 15 September President Clinton announced to the press “there [was] no point going any further with the present policy” (Hayes and Wheatley 1996, 16).

Although this was not the first time U.S. Army aircraft had deployed and operated off of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers--James Doolittle’s B-25 raid on Japan in 1942 had flown off USS *Hornet*--it was highly unusual. This operation may have proven more difficult than Doolittle’s, because the Army personnel would be using the carriers as mobile bases until shore bases were secured, not just using them as a platform for a single launch.

The plan was developed sixty days before the actual deployment. In an article that appeared in the January 1995 issue of *Armed Forces Journal*, Colonel James Casper, who then commanded the 10th Mountain Division’s Aviation Brigade, described the training and coordination that led up to the operation. The initial training occurred shortly after the mission was tasked at Fort Drum under the supervision of Navy instructor pilots on a painted simulation of an aircraft carrier flight deck. A week later, 10th Mountain’s Aviation brigade self-deployed UH-60 Black Hawk, AH-1 Cobra, and OH-58 Kiowa aircraft to rendezvous with USS *Theodore Roosevelt* off the Virginia

Capes. Over four days and nights more than 1,200 training landings were accomplished, half with night vision goggles. On 16 September 1994, enroute to Haiti, a full rehearsal was conducted, including uploading ammunition, and sling loading Humvees for transfer to the beach (Casper 1995, 40-41). Colonel Casper later explained the value of such rehearsals, and stated “the ability to conduct such rehearsals while moving toward an objective is one of the benefits of a naval launch platform” (Hurley 1997, 48).

Carrier support to the U.S. Army contingent was not limited to transport. As reported in a 1997 M.M.A.S. theses, by LCDR Donald J. Hurley, USN, *Eisenhower*'s Intelligence Department integrated with the intelligence elements of the 10th Mountain Division's Aviation Brigade and 1st Infantry Brigade combat team. To accomplish this integration Captain David Tohn, USA, the 10th Aviation Brigade S2, and Commander Mark Merrit, *Eisenhower*'s Intelligence Officer, established a “port and starboard” rotation--12 hours on, 12 hours off--in the carrier intelligence center (CVIC). During each shift Tohn or Merrit would supervise a watch team comprised of Army and Navy intelligence specialists who were striving to build the intelligence picture for the impending Haitian operation (Hurley 1997, 37 and 50). Further, Merrit loosened *Eisenhower*'s classified material control policies which required the material to remain in CVIC, to allow for decentralized planning in multiple Army tactical operation centers (TOCs) throughout the ship (Hurley 1997, 55).

By integrating the two service groups they were able to overcome the “language barrier” and shortfalls in understanding--Navy inexperience with Army intelligence requirements, and Army inexperience with Navy intelligence systems and hardware. Army personnel found Navy assistance invaluable in the garnishing of information from

the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Ship's Signal Exploitations Space (SSES), as well as planning and disseminating briefs through the ship's closed-circuit television (SCCTV) (Hurley 1997, 50). Of particular note were two new or unusual tools available board *Eisenhower*. The first was the Tactical Operational Preview System (TOPSCENE), delivered to *Eisenhower* by the Naval Strike Warfare Center en route to Haiti. This system uses a topographic database on an optical disk to create "virtual" video of a flight plan. TOPSCENE allowed Army aviators to "virtually fly" their upcoming Haitian missions sitting in front of a computer monitor (Hurley 1997 50-51).

The other boon to intelligence planning was the presence of LTJG Lee Hall, USNR. LTJG Hall was a U.S. Navy reservist who had serendipitously scheduled his annual active duty period months prior to the operation. By chance, Hall's full-time job was as a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst. He had conducted previous temporary duty support for Army units--and was familiar with Army intelligence requirements and operations--and had worked at the DIA's Haiti desk. His expertise, as well as his contacts in DIA, made him invaluable to the effort, and he was personally responsible for accomplishing many of the requests for information (RFIs) generated by Army planners (Hurley 1997, 40-41 and 62).

As H-hour approached Admiral Mauz, the Atlantic Fleet commander, aboard *Mount Whitney*, reported naval forces on station totaled forty ships and 14 thousand personnel, Navy SEALS had completed the required beach reconnaissance for the amphibious landing sites planned for Marines embarked on the USS *Wasp* ARG who would land at Cap-Haitien (Shacochis 1999, 69).

As the two carrier battle groups made their final approach to Haiti, and USAF transport aircraft carrying soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division invasion force were in the air. A U.S. diplomatic delegation, including former President Jimmy Carter, former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, convinced Cedras to relinquish power. This ended the requirement for JTF 180, and commenced a quick shift to JTF 190, the unopposed landing option. During the initial day of the operation Lieutenant General Shelton stayed aboard *Mount Whitney* until the Multi-National Force Command Center was established ashore by Major General Meade, 10th Mountain Division Commander. The *Mount Whitney* and both aircraft carriers stayed inside "the claw"--the Gulf of Gonave, between the two peninsulas that extend northwest and southwest from Haiti--to provide command and control support and mobile basing for JTF-180 operations (Ballard 1998, 114).

By the end of October the transition from hostile entry to unopposed peace keeping had been completed, and Navy ships were slowly drawn down from the operation. On 1 November the Pentagon announced the return of USS *Wasp*, USS *Nashville*, USS *America*, and USS *Ashland*, leaving only *Mount Whitney*, USNS *Leroy Grumman* (an oiler), and the patrol coastals USS *Hurricane* and USS *Monsoon* which stayed to continue their missions (Ballard 1998, 125). U.S. Navy patrol boats had been conducting a variety of operations since well prior to the September arrival of U.S. Army forces. Among the missions they had accomplished were refugee rescue, MIO operations conducted against the Haitian inter-island small-craft contraband trade, close shore patrols, U.S. Navy SEAL insertions and hydrographic surveys.

### Seabee Support

Naval Construction Battalions, Seabees, have long been a key U.S. Navy contribution to peace and humanitarian operations. Their value was highlighted when U.S. presence in Haiti reached its scheduled end date, 31 December 1997. The President ordered that the Seabee presence (180 Sailors), as well as 130 Air Force, and ninety Army personnel, continue their efforts in Haiti (Burlage 1997, 14). In mid-1997, Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 74 stationed in Gulfport, Mississippi, and NMCB 4, from Port Hueneme, California--in conjunction with Marines--completed a seven and a half-mile bypass road project that included a 200-foot-long, galvanized steel, two-lane bridge. Marine Corps General John Sheehan, CINCLANT, attended the impressive project's completion ceremony (Blazar 1997, 20). In fact, during that year Seabees spent 4,387 man-days constructing the road, South East Asia huts (SEA huts)—a wooden temporary barracks-like structure that houses 40 personnel--tension fabric structures, and a laundry facility (Second Naval Construction Brigade Command History 1997). During the time period from the U.S. forces arrival in 1994 until the end of 1997, Seabees

1. Built or rebuilt 17 schools
2. Helped renovate 19 other schools (with assistance from the crews of U.S. Coast Guard ships)
3. Renovated five other buildings
4. Collected and distributed over fifteen and a half tons of needed items to orphanages and welfare organizations
5. Planned and drilled twenty water wells

6. Completed the previously mentioned bypass road project (Burlage 1997).

#### Medical Support

U.S. Navy medical support to Haitian operations was not limited to the participation of USS *Comfort* during the operation's initial stages. An article in the December 1996 issue of *Marines* reported that Marines and Sailors attached to the 4th Medical Battalion--all corpsmen and doctors assigned to Marine Corps units are U.S. Navy personnel--had completed operation FAIRWINDS 96. The three-month medical and dental support mission was an exercise that continued the U.S. humanitarian and peace operations presence that began in 1994. During the exercise they treated more than 4,000 Haitians for malaria, scabies, AIDS, cancer, and other diseases. Medical personnel treated up to 200 patients on some days, including parents who had brought small children for treatment and were advised not to leave until they received necessary treatments themselves (DesNoyer 1996, 30).

Another article in the 25 August 1997 issue of *Navy Times* reported the return of a fifty-person medical detachment from U.S. Medical Support Group Haiti to Fleet Hospital Five in Bremerton, Washington. While in Haiti this detachment had worked at fifteen sites around Port-au-Prince, with a vaccination team making trips out of the city three times a week. Captain Brian Brannman, who commanded the detachment, reported that "The lion's share of the work was the humanitarian assistance clinics" (Ginsburg 1997, 19).

#### Conclusion

It is evident that U.S. Navy units provided a large amount of support to Haitian operations from 1993 to 1997, in a variety of roles. These missions were often "short

fused,” in that there was little time for prior coordination or planning. These operations were often conducted under somewhat arduous circumstances, requiring coordination between units unfamiliar with one another, in “proof on concept” situations. While the debate continues over whether an error in judgment marred the conduct of USS *Harlan County*’s arrival, on the whole Navy units were impressively successful in supporting U.S. goals and interests.

## CHAPTER 5

### FORMER REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

#### Introduction

This chapter will discuss U.S. Navy support to peace operations in the Former Yugoslavia. The chapter is divided into discussions of the separate missions, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and Implementation/Stabilization Forces (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia, and Operation Allied Force which consisted of strikes into Serbia and Kosovo and the deployment of U.S. forces into Albania and Macedonia. The U.S. Navy contribution to these operations included, but was not limited to, transport of forces and equipment, construction, intelligence, command, control, communications, computer and information (C4I), carrier air wing strikes, and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) strikes.

#### UN Protection Force through Deliberate Force

UNPROFOR was initiated in 1992 as the UN monitoring force for the Croatian/Yugoslavian cease-fire. Although UNPROFOR was initially authorized as a one-year mission, it was repeatedly extended until December 1994, when it transferred peacekeeping authority to the NATO-run IFOR. During the UNPROFOR mission the area of responsibility was expanded to include Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), when they too declared their independence from Yugoslavia (Wentz 1997, 15-16). In addition to the UN-controlled UNPROFOR mission, NATO established several supporting missions, including Sharp Guard, Deny Flight, and Deliberate Force. U.S. Navy contributions to UNPROFOR

operations were primarily limited to involvement in these three NATO-specific missions that supported UNPROFOR operations.



Figure 3. CIA Map of Bosnia (Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection)

### Operation Sharp Guard

Sharp Guard began in July 1992; it included the monitoring, and later monitoring and interdiction, of surface ship operations in the Adriatic Sea. Sharp Guard was conducted by NATO, Western European Union (WEU), and U.S. ships, in conjunction with Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) from the same organizations. The mission of Operation Sharp Guard was to enforce the UN mandated embargo on weapons delivery to the warring factions in the Balkans.

Throughout the operation U.S. Navy surface ships in the Adriatic Sea monitored merchant traffic. There was continual involvement of U.S. Navy P-3C Orions, and MPA from eight other nations. By the end of Sharp Guard these aircraft had completed a combined total of over 62,300 flight hours, during 1,100 continuous days of coverage, from bases on Sicily and Sardinia. Throughout the operation NATO and WEU forces challenged 73,000 ships, with over 5,800 inspected at sea, and 1,400 diverted and inspected in port. Six ships were caught attempting to break the embargo, and none were reported to have successfully broken it (Navy Europe News Service Press Release).

#### **Operation Deny Flight**

Deny Flight was begun during October 1992, and established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. During this 33-month operation NATO aircraft flew over 80,000 sorties--30 percent combat air patrol (CAP), 28 percent strike, 25 percent surveillance and reconnaissance, and 17 percent "other" (Wentz 1997, 22). U.S. Navy support to these operations included radar surveillance by ships within the Adriatic and carrier launched E-2s, reconnaissance flights by EP-3Es, and carrier based CAP.

#### **Operation Deliberate Force**

Deliberate Force was a series of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, from August to September 1995. Throughout Operation Deny Flight Bosnian Serbs had repeatedly tested UN, NATO, and U.S. resolve. In February 1994 U.S. Air Force aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb fighters flying out of Banja-Luka. Limited NATO air strikes were conducted in response to Serb aggression during August, September, and November 1994, and May and July of 1995 (Wentz 1997, 22).

As tensions rose in Bosnia during May 1995, USS *Theodore Roosevelt* was pulled from Exercise Trident Express in the Central Mediterranean. *Roosevelt*, along with her accompanying ARG, including USS *Kearsarge*, USS *Nashville*, and USS *Pensacola*, and the embarked 24th MEU (SOC), repositioned to the Adriatic Sea. These ships, along with cruisers USS *Mississippi* and USS *Hue City*, and frigate USS *Hawes*, joined destroyers USS *John Rogers*, and USS *Arleigh Burke*, which were already on station as part of operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard (NNS 368, see “Carrier, ARG Diverted to Adriatic Sea” 1995).

The following month these units played a key role in the recovery of Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady, who was shot down by a Bosnian Serb surface-to-air missile, on 2 June 1995. The mission--called tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP)--was conducted on 8 June by Marines from the 24th MEU (SOC), launched from USS *Kearsarge* (NNS 405, see “Rescued Air Force Pilot Thanks Navy and Marine Corps” 1995).

During the buildup of forces that summer the UN-sponsored Rapid Reaction Force was established. In support, two Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, USNS *Cape Race* and USNS *Cape Diamond*, were activated from the ready reserve force to transport equipment for a British air mobile brigade from Southampton, England to Croatia (NNS 464, see “MSC Ships Get Underway to Support Bosnia Operations” 1995).

On 28 August a mortar attack on a Sarajevo market killed thirty-eight civilians. At the time Bosnian Serbs were in positions surrounding the city, and it was believed that they had launched the attack on the Bosnian Muslim market district (Ripley 1996, 92). Although, as horrible as it sounds, later evidence indicated that the attack might have

been conducted by Muslims to create the outcry that led to their international support.

Regardless, in response to the attack, Operation Deliberate Force, NATO and UN approved air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, began on 30 August. Although *Roosevelt* had been repositioned to the Eastern Mediterranean to counter Iraqi saber rattling, she was able to quickly reposition--950 nautical miles in thirty-one hours--to launch strikes in accordance with the approved Deliberate Force timeline.

The first strike consisted of fifty aircraft from *Roosevelt*'s embarked Carrier Airwing Eight (CVW-8), including F/A-18s, F-14s, EA-6Bs, E-2s, and various tankers (NNS 578, see "NATO Air Strikes Successful" 1995). On 12 September, although the campaign was still underway, the *Roosevelt* battle group conducted a scheduled turnover with the USS *America* battle group (Navy Wire Service "A" [NWSA] 1322, see "USS *America* Battle Group Reaches Mid-Deployment>Returns to Adriatic" 1995). *America*'s airwing continued conducting strikes in conjunction with other land based U.S. and NATO aircraft, and tomahawk missile strikes launched from USS *Normandy* (NNS 610, see "Navy Launches Tomahawk Missiles Against Bosnian Serbs" 1995).

On 14 September Serb General Mladic "signaled" he was ready to remove his heavy weapons from the Sarajevo area, thus ending the siege. On 15 September, a French C-130 landed in Sarajevo reopening the air-bridge of supplies (Ripley 1996, 92). Subsequently, the warring parties met in Dayton, Ohio, during November 1995, and negotiated the Dayton Accords (Wentz 1997, 23).

#### UN Implementation Force and Stabilization Force

As part of the Dayton Accords the NATO-led IFOR officially began its peacekeeping operations in Bosnia on 16 December 1995. The force was assigned a one-

year mission to implement the accords that were to secure peace in Bosnia. The following year the force was renamed SFOR and it remains in Bosnia through today (Wentz 1997, 25).

With the commencement of IFOR operations, U.S. Navy MSC was instrumental in the repositioning of NATO peacekeeping cargo. In late December 1995, USNS *Cape Rise* and USNS *Cape Race* carried a total of 971 wheeled vehicles, 94 trailers, and 385 pallets of ammunition from ports in Germany and Belgium to Split, Croatia, for use by British elements of IFOR (NWSA 1387, see "Military Sealift Command Ships Arrive in Croatia" 1995).

U.S. Navy Seabees were a key element in providing the needed infrastructure for IFOR personnel who went into Bosnia. On 12 December 1995, 150 Navy Seabees from NMCB 133, of Gulfport, Mississippi, deployed to Croatia. Their mission was to build a 2,500-person staging area for NATO IFOR troops who entered Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Operation Joint Endeavor--Joint Endeavor was the official name for the IFOR operation, with the change to SFOR the operation was renamed Joint Guard (NWSA 1335, see "Seabees Deploy to Croatia" 1995). Two weeks later Seabees from the same unit built thirteen tents for U.S. Army construction engineers whose camp was washed away by a 28 December flood of the Sava River in east Croatia (Albritton 1995).

On 19 December 1995, 175 Seabees from NMCB 133 were directed to deploy to Bosnia (Schamhorst 1995). They left Rota, Spain two days later on U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft with fifty-eight pieces of building equipment, and 275,000 pounds of palletized material. An additional 520,000 pounds of building material was shipped from the unit's home base in Mississippi directly to a staging site in Hungary. These shipments of

material were required to build one of the four Army camps they were tasked with constructing, and other shipments followed (Brown 1995).

Later deployments of Seabees would integrate directly into Army units. An article in the April-May 1998 issue of *The Military Engineer* described one such deployment. NMCB ONE deployed 180 Seabees to Task Force Eagle, part of NATO's SFOR, under operational control of the Army 16th Engineer Battalion, First Armored Division. The Seabees integrated into the Army's repair parts supply system, implemented property accountability using Army procedures, and adapted their reporting and tracking procedures to meet 1st Armored Division requirements. While attached, the Seabees built a life support area for the Army unit on a hilltop, and improved the two-mile stretch of road--with a 12 percent slope--leading to the site. "Battling the muddy, mountainous terrain and inclement weather, the Seabees conducted over 100 tactical convoys, hauling construction materials, personnel, equipment, and 3,000 cubic meters of gravel." The Seabees also integrated an Australian Army engineer platoon that provided twelve 4-ton dump trucks with drivers, and supported the Seabees by hauling over 13,000 cubic meters of gravel for two road building projects (Korka and Worth 1998, 25-26).

Separate from the above Seabee operations, Admiral Leighton Smith, the senior U.S. officer in IFOR, requested assistance from another detachment of NMCB 133 Seabees. This element was made up of elements from Rota, Spain and Naples, Italy, and flown with twenty-four hours notice to Sarajevo. There they completed a mission to repair and rebuild the IFOR headquarters (NNS Europe 96002, see "Navy Seabees Answer Second Call to Bosnia" 1996).

U.S. Navy aircraft support to IFOR and SFOR included P-3Cs equipped with long-range electro-optical daylight video cameras and video-data links, and EP-3Es conducting reconnaissance missions. These aircraft monitored arms storage areas, troop movements, traffic, important government buildings, and key bridges and road intersections (Fulghum 1997, 31 and Wentz 1997, 106). The nine-hour missions transmitted black-and-white video of activity such as bridge and highway traffic to Army forces in Bosnia. Commander Ken Deusch, the operations officer for the 6th Fleet's maritime surveillance forces, stated that P-3Cs could "[In deteriorating situations] . . . look into embassy parking lots, see if there's room for helos to land" (Peniston 1998, 12).

As an interesting sidenote, during December of 1995 nine crewmembers assigned to USS *America*'s bake shop provided unique support to the SFOR troops in Sarajevo, when they worked around the clock for two days baking 5,250 Christmas cookies for the multinational force members. The cookies were flown into Sarajevo by two of *America*'s embarked U.S. Navy SH-60 Seahawk helicopters on 20 December (Schofield 1995).

Without intending to give later units short shrift, there is not enough space to list all units involved, or their contributions. U.S. Navy forces involved in IFOR/SFOR provide continued support, while going through their regular rotations. There has always been a U.S. Navy Surface Action Group present, if not an ARG or Carrier Battle Group. Seabees have rotated both active duty and reserve units through--presumably to lighten the strain on active duty units. P-3C missions are flown continuously by the currently deployed VP squadron, and Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron Two, which is stationed in Europe, flies continuing EP-3E missions in Bosnia. Finally, Navy EA-6B squadrons rotate through detachments to Aviano, Italy, alongside Marine EA-6B squadrons. While

the names of the units change every six months, they provide the same support today as when the operation started. This support includes airborne intelligence and confirmation of continued compliance with the Dayton Accords, logistic support, and the ever-present threat of force if there is a return to noncompliance. It is this threat, and actual use of force that is the major theme of the next section on the conflict in Kosovo.

#### Allied Force

Operation Allied Force stands apart from the previous two Balkan efforts that were predominantly peacekeeping--with the exception of brief periods under UNPROFOR. Allied Force was a peace-enforcement mission that was conducted at the mid to high-end of the warfare spectrum, meaning NATO, and U.S. forces, administered force liberally in a seventy-eight-day bombing campaign, from March to June 1999, in both Kosovo and Serbia. The campaign forced Serbian compliance with the October 1998 agreement, signed by both parties, and the Rambouillet Accords, signed by Kosovar Albanians, but not Serbian leader Milosevic (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, cover letter and 2).

Allied Force was a combined U.S. and NATO operation--the U.S. provided the preponderance of air forces--directed at ending Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. The three stated goals of the operation were to ensure the stability of Eastern Europe, thwart ethnic cleansing, and ensure NATO's credibility. (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, cover letter) The campaign began on the evening of 24 March 1999, when land based aircraft struck targets within Kosovo and Yugoslavia. From the outset U.S. Navy aircraft were present. EA-6B Prowler aircraft out of Aviano, Italy, provided jamming and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) services, whilst EP-3E aircraft out of

Souda Bay, Crete, provided electronic warfare (EW) intelligence. Additionally, U.S. Navy ships *Philippine Sea* and *Gonzales* fired Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) at Serb targets (NNS 1301, see “U.S. Forces Participate in NATO Strike on Serbian Targets” 1999).

At the commencement of the operation there were over 6,500 Sailors and Marines embarked upon U.S. Navy ships within the 6th Fleet operational area, which includes the Adriatic. This number represents a Naval force base-line, as the absence of an aircraft carrier’s presence illustrates that there was no build-up of Naval forces in anticipation of the confrontation. Ships present included cruiser USS *Philippine Sea*; destroyers USS *Thorn*, USS *Gonzales*, and USS *Nicholson*; attack submarines USS *Miami* and USS *Norfolk*; 6th Fleet command ship USS *LaSalle*; supply and support ships USS *Monongahela* and USS *Grapple*; and finally, the amphibious ready group, which included USS *Nassau*, USS *Nashville*, USS *Pensacola*, and the embarked 24th MEU (SOC) (NNS 1301, see “U.S. Forces Participate in NATO Strike on Serbian Targets” 1999).

By 3 April the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* Carrier Battle Group had arrived in the Mediterranean and commenced operations in support of Allied Force. The *Roosevelt* Battle Group included the cruisers USS *Vella Gulf* and USS *Leyte Gulf*; destroyer USS *Ross*; frigate USS *Halyburton*; combat support ship USS *Arctic*; and attack submarine USS *Albuquerque* (DOD Public Affairs April 1999). Shortly thereafter, on 14 April, the USS *Kearsarge* ARG, which included USS *Ponce* and USS *Gunston Hall*, left Hampton Roads, Virginia, for Moorehead City, North Carolina, to embark the 26th MEU (SOC),

commencing their Mediterranean deployment. The *Kearsarge* ARG relieved the *Nassau* ARG, and subsequently play a large roll in post-air strike activity in Kosovo.



Figure 4. CIA Map of Kosovo (Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection)

The surface ships above provided far more than simple presence in the Adriatic Sea. They continued the enforcement of the embargo on Yugoslavia, preventing resupply via the Montenegrin ports of Bar and Tivat, and provided an significant strike capability. Kosovo after-action reports laud the impact of TLAM equipped ships, which often were the only strike options available. “. . . Conditions in Kosovo were such that there was at least 50 percent cloud cover more than 70 percent of the time, hampering our ability to use laser-guided munitions and putting a premium on other preferred weapons” (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, 98). Thus, there was a stated preference for TLAM and JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition, employed by the B-2 bomber), which provide GPS inputs for guidance (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, xxiii). “[These weapons] provided the capability to penetrate enemy air defenses and attack a wide spectrum of targets throughout the battlespace” (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, 91). Further, TLAMs were continuously present in the theater, and could be used to execute timely attack. This gave the joint force commander the ability to utilize the principles of surprise, initiative, and massed firepower on key campaign targets. Six ships and three submarines from two U.S. Navy battlegroups and one UK submarine launched 218 missiles in preplanned and quick-reaction strikes. Target types ranged from traditional headquarters buildings and other infrastructure targets to relocatable targets such as aircraft and surface-to-air missile launchers. Tomahawk was often the weapon of choice for targets with the potential for high collateral damage, and was used to attack numerous targets in Belgrade . . . In fact, Allied Force saw the successful realization of TLAM as a tactical weapon (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense, 92 and 97).

Navy land and sea based aircraft also brought significant firepower and capability. Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW) were effectively employed from Navy F/A-18 aircraft. (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, 92) Navy F-14 aircraft equipped with the Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) were used to identify targets, and Navy maritime patrol aircraft made significant contributions to the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection effort. “The processing times achieved with these assets were well within the required timelines for the air tasking order, and in several cases allowed the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to reassign aircraft to new targets rapidly (called “flex targeting”) (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, 58).

One of the “stars” of operation Allied Force was the EA-6B aircraft, which took over full responsibility for the DOD joint jamming mission with the retirement of the EF-111 in 1998. “EA-6B aircraft were absolutely important to the air operation. The EA-6B is the only U.S. electronic-attack aircraft able to use electronic jamming to suppress enemy air defenses. Consequently, EA-6Bs are in high demand and are one of the Low Density/High Demand assets established in the Global Military Force Policy” (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense, 66). EA-6Bs were both sea based, on *Roosevelt*, and shore based in Aviano, Italy. The Aviano based squadron, VAQ-140, flew over 717 combat sorties in support of the operation, totaling more than 3,100 combat hours (DOD Public Affairs June 1999).

A new Navy land attack capability was introduced during this operation, when “P-3Cs fired air-to-surface missiles at mobile missile platforms and aircraft maintenance buildings on more than a dozen occasions.” This was the first combat employment of

Standoff Land Attack Missiles (SLAM) from P-3s (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, 93). The Kosovo AAR specifically compliments naval contributions to strike missions such as Navy carrier-based aircraft, cruise missile equipped ships and submarines, EA-6B radar jammers, and High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) equipped F/A-18s (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, 79). Yet, Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, U.S. Sixth Fleet Commander, provided the best summary during a news conference two days before the cessation of hostilities.

It was the air wing that was central to the progress that we've seen in our ability to identify locations [of Serb forces] and defeat them . . . Navy F-18s and EA-6Bs have fired 147 HARM missiles, or 47 percent of all HARMs fired by U.S. forces. CVW-8 F-14s provided laser guidance to targets for U.S. Air Force A-10s. Navy F-14s also served as forward air controllers and were airborne for approximately 50 percent of all close air support missions. More than 3,100 combat sorties were launched from the carrier without a single loss of aircraft or personnel. (NNS 2802, see "Sixth Fleet Commander Discusses Navy Contribution to Kosovo" 1999)

When NATO attacks ceased on 10 July 1999, 1,900 Marines, including elements of the 26th MEU (SOC) Battalion Landing Team departed USS *Kearsarge*, USS *Gunston Hall*, and USS *Ponce*, from their locations in the Aegean Sea. The Marines traveled through Thessaloniki, Greece, Skopje, FYROM, and finally into Kosovo on 13 June. They were the first U.S. ground force into Kosovo, and became part of the U.S. contingent of NATO's Multi-national Peacekeeping Force, ensuring the security of returning ethnic Albanian refugees. The 26th MEU (SOC) was later relieved by the Army's 1st Infantry Division (NNS 2802, see "Sixth Fleet Commander Discusses Navy Contribution to Kosovo." 1999, and Kozaryn 1999). Importantly, it was the flexibility and mobility of the Navy-Marine team that allowed the pre-staging of the ARG at the

ideal location to rapidly deploy a stabilizing force into Kosovo, until the arrival of Army follow-on units.

Additionally, the deployment of the 1st Infantry Division was supported heavily by the U.S. Navy, as MSC ships, USNS *Bob Hope* and USNS *Sondeman*, with carrying capacities of 26,000 tons, transported the unit's equipment and vehicles from Bremerhaven, Germany to Thessaloniki (Kozaryn 1999). However, the Kosovo AAR was somewhat critical of other incidents of under-utilization of MSC, stating “[Since Desert Storm] we have purchased nineteen large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs); ten have been delivered.” Yet, “we relied heavily on strategic airlift to deploy forces to the theater, while the sealift component of the strategic mobility triad lay essentially idle” (Kosovo AAR, see Department of Defense 2000, 41).

U.S. Navy Seabees followed shortly after the Marines, and began arriving in Kosovo on 29 June 1999. The first contingent numbered approximately 375 Seabees, from NMCB 3 in Port Hueneme, California, under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division (Smith 1999). The Seabee mission was to construct U.S. Army Camp Montieth. The mission was completed in conjunction with Army engineers, and U.S. civilian contractor Brown and Root. This included the construction of sixty-four Davidson South East Asia huts (SEA huts), to provide berthing for 1,700 soldiers, constructing six guard towers, installing dirt-filled (Hesco-Bastion) barricades, and relocating the earthen perimeter berm (Smith 1999). Because these SEA huts were heated and air-conditioned, they far surpassed the alternative, a ten person tent (Levins 1999, A12). Upon the Seabee’s arrival there was no power, water, or mess hall. Within 24 hours they had restored water, and within 48 hours they had repaired the power and

built tents for the use of soldiers. Finally, by 3 July, they had completed a “hot-chow” mess hall (Levins 1999, A12).

Seabees input to the overall accomplishment of the peacekeeping mission did not stop with their specifically tasked missions. While completing their construction tasking, they found time to accomplish humanitarian missions as well. They repaired the village school in Uglare, which had been virtually destroyed by the Serbs who used it as a barracks. Seabees graded and filled the road leading to it, repaired structural damage to the building, and rebuilt the destroyed playground equipment, including seesaws and soccer goals--which were netted with Serb camouflage material that was left behind. Additionally, Seabees supplied the school with pencils, chalk, rulers, and other basic school supplies, paying out of their own pockets (Levins 1999, A14).

Members of the Seabee unit used their special skills to help in anyway they could. Their assigned doctor, Lieutenant Tammy Penhollow, MC, in conjunction with her Army counterparts provided medical treatment to Kosovars at clinics in the towns surrounding Camp Montieth. Seabees also restocked bare supply shelves at a 350-patient hospital in Gnjilane, using medication nearing their expiration date, and raised money to buy diapers and bottles for the same hospital’s nursery. Lieutenant Clint Pickett, a Lutheran minister and Seabee chaplain, acted as an intermediary between local Islamic and Orthodox leaders. One of his accomplishments was setting up Islamic services for peacekeepers from the United Arab Emirates (Levins 1999, A14).

The Seabee activities were not the first instances of Navy humanitarian assistance during Kosovo operations. USS *Inchon*, a mine countermeasures ship, had used its embarked MH-53 helicopters to deliver 6,000 pounds of relief supplies to the refugee

camp in Kukes, Albania, on 11 April at the midpoint of the campaign. At that time there were an estimated 200,000 refugees at the site in northern Albania (USS *Inchon* Task Group Public Affairs 1999).

### Conclusion

The case of the Former Yugoslavia is notable because most operations were conducted within Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, which are essentially land-locked regions--Bosnia has a small corridor of territory that leads to the Dalmatian Coast that offers no port, and was usually not controlled by the Bosnians. Yet, in spite of their inland locales, the U.S. Navy played an essential role in all U.S. operations within the regions. This ability to contribute out of the Navy's assumed "ocean-going element" is continuing proof of the service's flexibility and force projection capability, and a tribute to the Sailors involved.

## CHAPTER 6

### ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

#### Introduction

This chapter analyzes the ability of the U.S. Navy to effectively conduct Peace Operations. Specifically discussed will be enabling factors such as U.S. Navy peace operations doctrine, training, and the effectiveness of U.S. Navy organization--including manning, and equipment--in conducting peace operations. These three enabling factors will then be reviewed with respect to past U.S. Navy peace operations, to determine how the U.S. Navy is actually doing, and if improvements can be made.

#### U.S. Navy Peace Operations Doctrine

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* states, “This manual supports soldiers and leaders who execute peace operations” (Barns 1996, 10). Unfortunately, while there is a plethora of U.S. Navy doctrine covering an endless number of topics available, no equivalent U.S. Navy peace operations doctrine currently exists.

The U.S. Navy, like all services, draws its doctrinal guidance from joint doctrine. Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, is the cornerstone of U.S. peace operations. The publication provides excellent “big picture” guidance. It includes four sections, including a peace operations “primer,” peacekeeping guidance, peace enforcement guidance, and education and training. However, the publication’s discussion of maritime operations vis-à-vis peace operations is limited in scope. Primarily, the publication provides a list of “generic” maritime missions, such as providing a sustainment platform, escort duty, search and rescue, and coastal control and patrol (JP 3-07.3, see Department of Defense 1999 and

Barns 1996, 17). The publication allows that naval forces would simply conduct these general “warfighting” missions in support of peace operations. While this assumption is true, it falls short of explaining the non-traditional mission support evidenced in the three preceding case studies.

One might assume that a more specific peace operations doctrine would be readily available from U.S. Navy sources, but the reality is both “yes” and “no.” Naval Doctrine Publication 3, *Operations* (Draft) dedicates its second chapter to military operations other than war. In essence, this document defines the multiple missions embodied under the (MOOTW) moniker, and provides very brief examples of U.S. Navy participation. The discussion on peace operations is limited to providing the joint definitions of peace operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement (Naval Warfare Doctrine Command). A derivative of this publication is Naval Warfare Publication 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*. This publication too is general in nature, and reiterates the conduct of the same core responsibilities of naval forces in a MOOTW setting as the previous documents.

The trend in U.S. Navy MOOTW doctrine, as well as joint doctrine for that matter, is to explain the fundamental differences between warfighting and MOOTW missions, list core competencies, and let the participant figure out the required actions. The Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook states,

To accomplish your mission, you will have to refocus your thinking from warfighting to peace operations, particularly for peacekeeping. This should not be interpreted as de-emphasizing warfighting. It simply means that peace operations have uncertainties that require a different view.  
(Barns 1996, 12)

The question remains whether this doctrine is adequate, or if it must go further.

In a 1996 paper submitted to the U.S. Navy War College, Commander William Flemming Barns, USN, reviewed the U.S. Navy's commitment to the conduct of peace operations. Concluding his review of doctrine, he stated

It is apparent from this review that existing doctrine is adequate, but continued innovation in its application is required. To achieve the proper balance without sacrificing fundamental warfighting capability and expand engagement with future coalition partners--those organized under UN auspices as well as ad hoc--requires the Naval services to continually refine command and control arrangements. (Barns 1996, 15)

I am of two minds over Commander Barns' assessment. He is absolutely correct that continued innovation and application are required; and he is also correct in his implication that there is a fine line between improving MOOTW capability and degrading "fundamental warfighting" capability--discussed further below. But, I somewhat disagree with his statement "It is apparent from this review that existing doctrine is adequate." I believe that improvements in doctrine could be made.

As we have seen, there is currently U.S. Navy doctrine on peace operations and MOOTW in general, but it is often a rehash of joint doctrine on the same subject matter. While a very few case studies or scenario examples are provided, the Sailors on the scene are frequently left to their own devices. I am a strong proponent of initiative and leadership by negation. Yet, there should be a "happy median" that provides commanders and other participants historic examples and loose guidance. This is not to limit their flexibility, but to provide them an ability to tap the lessons of the past, including previous U.S. Navy successes and failures.

The U.S. Army uses two methods to accomplish this task, doctrine and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). A comprehensive Army doctrine is readily available for reference by soldiers conducting almost any task or function. Many of these doctrinal publications provide excellent case studies and examples, in addition to the principles and guidelines one would expect from doctrine. Yet, there are two limiting factors to the creation of an authoritative peace operations doctrine. First, from a cultural standpoint Sailors would find it limiting and binding, thus there would be resistance. Historically, the U.S. Navy has adhered to a policy of “leadership by negation.” Because ships often operate individually, commanders are expected to act immediately in emergent situations, using their best judgement and then reporting their actions. Commanders are encouraged to display independence and only receive direction when inappropriate decisions are “negated” by their seniors. A move to restrict specific operations to a “doctrinal format” would be perceived as micro-management.

Second, there is a need for an authoritative body to study all of the past operations before creating a functional doctrine, a requirement that is obviously manpower intensive. Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC), in Newport, Rhode Island, is tasked with the development of Navy doctrine, a mission they ably perform. However, like all commands, they presumably face manning limitations that prevent their branching out away from the previous doctrine tasking they have received.

The second method for research available to Army personnel is CALL. CALL is a lessons learned database that is accessible via the internet. Any soldier with a password, which are issued liberally to individuals with a need, can access the data base and search the entire after action report catalog for lessons learned from previous similar

missions. The U.S. Navy is currently making strides to create a system that is CALL's equal. In July 1998 Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, chartered NWDC to "champion warfare innovation and concept development." Out of this direction grew the Naval Lessons Learned System (NLLS). This system is a set of two CD-ROMs that contain classified and unclassified versions of the Navy Lessons Learned Database (NLLDB). NLLS is an improvement upon the previous Navy Tactical Information Compendium (NTIC) system, and makes a previously unwieldy database manageable for the common user. This is obviously a large step forward (Naval Warfare Doctrine Command).

#### U.S. Navy Peace Operations Training

U.S. Navy training for peace operations is limited to a single course of instruction provided by the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group (EWTG), Atlantic. This command provides an outstanding course on MOOTW that includes peace operations as a subset. Although only a week in duration, the course packages an enormous amount of information into its syllabus and manual, and provides ready reference for the student should they later be faced with conducting actual MOOTW missions.

The course includes lessons on the essence of MOOTW and its sub-missions, as well as specific lessons on peace operations, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and a peace operations case study. The course walks the student through all of the elements that must be managed in MOOTW operations to achieve success. Joint, interagency, and multinational planning and coordination are studied. The importance of multinational organizations such as the UN and NATO, as well as regional organizations such as the Western European Union, Gulf Cooperation Council,

and South Pacific Forum, in peace operations is discussed at length. The legal basis for UN operations, as well as the UN organization, is reviewed. Missions such as public affairs, civil affairs, intelligence, and psychological operations, health service support, and civil engineering, in support of overarching mission goals are discussed at length. Students are given an introduction to mediation and negotiations, and their importance. And finally, instruction is provided on training considerations, with the stated intent of enabling the student to create a unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) tailored for a specific peace operation.

The subject matter of this course is in and of itself of enormous benefit. But, its value is increased by its reference list that provides many avenues for the student to continue research and find answers to the questions they may later face. The course draws heavily from Joint, Army, and Navy doctrine, as well as foreign doctrine sources such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the UN. Although, EWTG is a combined Navy and Marine command, the course is provided to members of all services upon request, and has been taught “on the road” to foreign services as well. The course is of enormous benefit, and should be considered by any command that may face the challenge of peace operations.

#### Compatibility of U.S. Navy Structure for Peace Operations

The question of whether or not the Navy is adequately “organized” for the conduct of peace operations is a twofold question that includes both manning and equipment. Because the Navy’s “Title 10” tasking is to fight and win our nation’s wars at sea, the U.S. Navy is organized to do exactly that. U.S. Navy ships include aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers, to project force, primarily in the form of aircraft and

missiles “forward from the sea,” and to control vital sea lines of communication. Amphibious vessels are designed to provide Marines a method of projecting their own devastating version of force forward, by land, sea, and air. Subordinate to these primary missions are countless others in direct and indirect support. Fuel and cargo ships provide for CVBGs and ARGs. Land based aircraft provide reconnaissance support to both. The list goes on indefinitely. Accordingly, the force structure to man these units with the appropriate expertise and number of sailors is determined with the sole intent of accomplishing warfighting missions. This truth is echoed in a memorandum from a Working Group on Peace Operations, dated 20 Jan 1995, which frames the “Navy Position on Peace Operations.” “The Navy does not generally designate specific skills or units to MOOTW . . . Navy Construction Battalions build and defend whether they are in Somalia, Haiti, or Iraq; Navy doctors, nurses, and corpsmen perform trauma care regardless of where the injuries were received” (Barns 1996, 6, 16, and 25).

It is conceivable that equipment could be procured with the intent of accomplishing peace operations first, and warfighting second. This method would likely move U.S. Navy force structure away from a concentration on surface combatants, and instead center upon what are now considered support units, such as cargo and transport vessels. Manning too could be reallocated to build up construction units, and draw down submarine forces. Yet these changes would only incrementally improve national MOOTW capabilities, while eliminating other required naval warfare capabilities.

Past operations, evidenced in the three preceding case studies, show that sailors have an uncanny ability to adapt available equipment for new and unforeseen missions. Examples are abundant. In Haiti, two U.S. Navy aircraft carriers were used as platforms

for U.S. Army helicopter and SOF operations. Additionally, Navy support elements, which were never foreseen interacting with Army units, were able to provide invaluable no-notice assistance to soldiers en route to a combat zone. Ships that had been tasked to simply transport cargo made up for the unanticipated potable water shortage in Somalia by using common sense and innovation. Their almost “Rube Goldberg” mission tends to belie the severity of the situation at the time. Although operations in Bosnia and Kosovo included air strikes at the “high end” of the conflict spectrum, it is unlikely that the Seabees provided construction support to U.S. Army engineers who’s camp had been washed away, or P-3s--an aircraft originally designed for anti-submarine warfare--conducting photo-reconnaissance of Serb cantonment sites, were ever considered as wartime missions.

The equipment in the current U.S. Navy inventory has been used expertly to assist in the completion of MOOTW missions, including peace operations, and will continue to do so. “Fixed and rotary wing aircraft, such as the C-2, SH-3 or SH-60, can provide short-haul supply transport to forces ashore. Rotary wing aircraft may be especially suited to this mission in a logistically immature theater with inadequate airfields” (Cropper 1995, 11). Reconnaissance assets such as the P-3, EP-3E, and TARPS equipped F-14 provide assets that validate peacekeeping missions such as disarmament (Cropper 1995, 9). Finally, improving technology and developmental systems make future participation of U.S. Navy elements in peace operations more promising. An excellent example is Sander Corporation’s development of the U.S. Navy’s Advanced Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS), which will allow aircraft to detect subsurface sea mines. In that Sanders is also a subcontractor for the U.S. Army’s Vehicle Mounted

Mine Detection System (VMMD), it is conceivable that land mine detection technology may eventually be adapted to naval aircraft who conduct routine peace operations missions “feet dry” (Military and Aerospace Electronics 1999).

U.S. Navy assets such as the CVBG provide a wide range of mission capabilities. Among them are “... rapid response, impressive C4I structures, timely intelligence collection and distribution, responsive airborne surveillance, and precision force protection--which have been the driving force behind repeated CV deployments in peace operations” (Cropper 1995, ii). The value of these capabilities is due to the speed with which can arrive. “One of the greatest contributions that carrier airpower brings to [peace operations] is its mobility. Whereas three to four months lag time now exists between the authorizations and deployment of ground units for UN operations, a CV can typically arrive in a matter of days” (Cropper 1995, 3). Critics point out that the CVBG does fall short in conducting missions such as PSYOP, night observation, degraded weather force protection, and delivery of min-lethality weapons (Cropper 1995, ii). The CVBG was never anticipated to conduct these missions, but the capability could be added.

Innovative solutions to equipment and organizational problems have been proposed. In a 1996 paper submitted to the Naval War College, Alvah E. Ingwersoll, Major, USMC, discussed the functionality of Naval Expeditionary Task Groups (NETGs). “These NETGs would be comprised of assets from the CVBG and ARG/MEU, but would operate independently from it, in mission tailored organizations, deployed over dispersed geographic zones, within a CINC’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). The NETGs would maintain the ability to concentrate for regional war

contingencies” (Ingersoll 1996, 2). This “mini-AJFP” system has the benefit of tapping virtually all the theater naval capabilities, while leaving those not required free to conduct other contingency missions (Ingersoll 1996, ii). Additionally, by using smaller vessels than the carrier--if it is not required--the task force increases its capacity to integrate with multinational forces (Ingersoll 1996, 22). Ingersoll concluded with the sage advice “The future in OOTW requires the operational artist to think of naval forces not in terms of structure and size but capability” (Ingersoll 1996, 22).

### Analysis

General Anthony Zinni, the JTF Commander for Operation United Shield and now USCINCCENT, aptly described current attitudes towards MOOTW and peace operations. Reflecting on his personal experience, he remarked, “These kinds of operations are consuming our armed forces right now. Whether we should or we shouldn’t, I’ll tell you this--we are” (Barns 1996, 15). And that, quite simply, is the reality. Until a major theater war prevents itself we will continue to conduct peace and other low intensity operations, while having to remain ever prepared for the eventual high intensity conflict.

The previous discussion of the U.S. Navy and its participation in peace operations reveal several themes. First, sailors, in conjunction with soldiers, marines, and airmen, will find innovative ways to accomplish a tasked mission. Second, the naval forces that have done these missions have regularly surpassed reasonable expectations of success. Third, as discussed above, lack of doctrine, lack of training, and current structure may have slightly limited participant’s contributions, but at the same time had serendipitous effect, giving birth to tremendously creative thinking. Finally, although not an issue of

research for this paper, one theme continually repeats itself. The true limiting factor seems to be a negative mindset towards peace operations, as well as all MOOTW missions. Common thought is that peace operations are simply missions conducted while we await the emergence of another peer competitor. This theme is evident in many of the writings appearing in professional journals, the lack of doctrine and training, and discussions with fellow CGSC students. Further, I suspect it will again reveal itself in the recent survey conducted here at the request of the Army Chief of Staff.

In the May 1995 issue of *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Captain K. L. Eichelberger, USN, discussed his personal experience with this phenomenon while attached to JTF Somalia in 1994. Eichelberger believes that due to limited interest in the operation, and a cultural tendency to give staffs short shrift, an appropriately experienced officer was not provided to the JTF staff to serve as a naval liaison officer.

The active-duty Navy did not want to man the billet [amphibious planner] and turned it over to the reserves. A reserve officer volunteered, but he commanded a unit and was only available for 90 days; his amphibious experience had been as an active duty ensign and LTJG while serving on an LST. When he arrived in Somalia, he was assigned as the Deputy J-3 and situation report writer because he had no recent amphibious experience. The Navy did not provide the right officer for the billet.  
(Eichelberger 1995)

Eichelberger concluded that due to systemic short sightedness the planning of the operation suffered. He stated that the Navy must undergo a “cultural change” in its attitude towards the selection of liaison officers, and same might be implied about MOOTW.

### Conclusion

While speaking at the commissioning ceremony for USS *Harry S. Truman* in 1998, President Clinton emphasized the importance of U.S. Navy contributions to recent operations, and thus its responsibility to continually improve for future operations.

Harry Truman knew that a president's ability to persuade others in the world is greatly enhanced when commanding the world's strongest military. This is still true. When we aimed to restore hope in Haiti four years ago, the Navy was there to make it happen. When violence tore apart Bosnia, naval operations in the Adriatic helped to create the conditions of peace. When we needed quick action in the Persian Gulf last winter, the Navy was there to put steel behind our diplomacy. . . . The Navy will be there again. . . . (Burlage 1998)

Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold once said that "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it" (Barns 1996, 1). In our era of joint operations it is a mission for sailors too.

[Peace] operations are crucial to deterring and preventing conflict and represent a core competency of each military service. Accordingly, the Department of the Navy can bring substantial talent to bear in reaching solutions: there are options available to an operational commander to adequately prepare the naval component which will also benefit the entire joint force. (Barns 1996, 1)

Upon closer review, it is apparent that naval forces provide sizable contributions to these efforts and can enhance readiness for potential tasking. With an inherent ability to operate globally or concentrate regionally, naval forces are uniquely qualified for peace operations. (Barns 1996, 5)

In that 70 percent of the world's population lives within 100 miles of the sea and the fact that in some instances seaborne platforms may be our only authorized staging area, the potential requirement for naval forces is obvious (Grove 1999). For as General Carl Mundy, USMC, stated in a February 1993 article in *Marine Corps Gazette*, "The

time is soon approaching when naval forces may be the only credible response of the nation for a fast-breaking crisis" (Mundy 1993, 15).

In conclusion, the U.S. Navy has done an outstanding job in the peace and humanitarian assistance operations it has been tasked. However, there have been some missteps, and there is always room for improvement. While it is not recommended that the U.S. Navy change organizationally to prepare for MOOTW contingencies, training and doctrine could be enhanced. As Commander H. H. Fischer stated at the conclusion of the 1st DENBN after action report for Operation Restore Hope, "It is not enough to do the best we can, we must know what the right thing to do is in the first place" (Fischer 1993).

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
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
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